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ABSTRACT
The rapid growth of equity real estate investment trusts (REITs) since 1992 has
been prompted by the need or desire of property owners to refinance debt or access
capital. Equity REIT market capitalization increased by $30 billion between year end
1991 and year end 1994. This increase provided funds to recapitalize debt no longer
available from private market lenders.
During this period owners of regional mall portfolios utilized the umbrella
partnership real estate investment trust (UPREIT) structure to change their operating
status to REITs. The decision to become a publicly traded REIT was motivated by two
factors; the public market was valuing property at greater prices than the private market
and the opportunity to defer taxable gains.
The goal of this thesis is to determine what pricing differences exist between the
private and public regional mall REITs. Through discussions with industry professionals it
became clear that property acquisitions are analyzed in a similar manner in both markets.
Differences are purported to exist at the REIT portfolio valuation level. The public REITs
are supposedly credited with factors in addition to underlying property value, which are
assumed to add value to the REIT.
The implicit property capitalization rate that has been calculated seems to refute
the existence of pricing differences between the private and public markets. Differences in
the implicit property capitalization rates can be explained by asset quality and portfolio
performance. Investors in REITs value the quality of management and other factors as a
function of the cash flow that the investment returns. REIT valuation is consistent in both
markets, public regional mall REITs do not command a premium.
Thesis Advisor: Blake Eagle
Title: Chairman, MIT Center For Real Estate
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INTRODUCTION
The Question
Between 1992 and 1994 there was an explosion in initial public offerings (IPOs) of
real estate investment trusts (REITs). This served as a vehicle for over-leveraged firms to
recapitalize debt as well as an investment option for investors. The real estate recession of
the late 1980's and the simultaneous devaluation of assets forced many firms to
recapitalize property debt publicly as private market sources were no longer available.
Wall Street acted as the catalyst and positioned REITs as high yielding investments in a
low interest rate environment.
Questions arose as to whether there were arbitrage opportunities between the
private and public markets. The arbitrage, many people believed, existed due to the
discrepancies in the way assets were being priced in the private and public markets. To
what extent does this discrepancy exist? Is it confined only to the assets themselves or
does it impact the value of the REIT as well?
This thesis addresses these questions by examining four regional mall REITs, two
privately owned and two traded publicly. By isolating the regional mall sector a
comparison of both public and private firms that own substantially similar assets can be
accomplished. Information about each REIT allows for relative analysis of discrepancies
that may or may not exist between the private and public markets.
This thesis posits that, while pricing differences may have existed at one time
between the private and public markets, fundamental acquisition methodology and
ultimate property value is presently consistent in both markets. Differences between the
private and public markets have been professed by proponents of public REITs (including
REIT management, analysts, and other Wall Street sources). The supposed value of
management and liquidity command that public REITs should trade at a premium to their
asset value. Ultimately, though, the investor determines what aspects of an investment are
valuable and assigns a financial value. An examination of the return investors command in
each market should reflect whether these differences exist.
The Issues
A number of factors contributed to the fury of IPO activity in the early 1990s.
Abundant capital for real estate investment in the 1980s came from real estate
syndications, savings and loans, banks, life insurance companies, and pension funds. This
capital in conjunction with enormous tax benefits of real estate investment set the stage for
massive overbuilding. Competition among investors stretched the limits of prudent
underwriting practices. Many lenders assumed inordinate risks as developers and
investors were granted lenient terms which included higher loan to value ratios and non-
recourse loans.
It was a matter of time before the United States commercial property markets
reached substantial overbuilt status. Property values eventually plummeted. Once supply
of space greatly exceeded demand private market lenders and property owners realized
considerable losses. The market's crash caused real estate funding sources to evaporate.
Development and investment ground to a halt and liquidity disappeared.
Interest in filling the capital void left by traditional private market sources piqued
fee hungry investment bankers as they sought to exploit emerging opportunities. The
REIT operating structure facilitated recapitalization of real estate operating companies in
the public equity markets.
Wall Street sold property owners on the concept that investors in public equities
would accept lower yields for liquidity than the yields real estate investors were
demanding in the highly illiquid private market. A low interest rate environment caused
public market investors to welcome current yields at eight percent. In comparison, private
markets were using capitalization rates in the 10 to 12% range to determine asset values.
A capitalization rate is defined as the ratio of net operating income to property value,
providing an estimation of current return.' The positive spread between the two markets
created arbitrage opportunities for public REITs. The public equity recapitalization option
looked good to some property operators who otherwise faced the possible loss of assets
1 William B. Brueggeman and Jeffrey D. Fisher. Real Estate Finance and Investment (Homewood:
Irwin, 1993), p. 319.
due to foreclosure or diminished proceeds from private market sales. Not only were
owners able to realize immediate financial benefits, they also maintained control of their
assets.
To examine the pricing differences between the private and public markets the
regional mall sector was selected. A number of real estate developers utilized the
Umbrella Partnership Real Estate Investment Trust (UPREIT) to source capital in the
public markets. The existence of private regional mall REITs allows for comparison
between the private and public markets.
Comparison between the markets will focus on property level pricing and valuation
of REITs. Property level pricing will be examined as to how acquisitions are analyzed.
Observation at the REIT level will examine private appraisal methodology and two public
market pricing models. The calculation of implicit capitalization rates for each REIT will
determine the unleveraged return achieved on total REIT property value as the basis for
distinguishing any pricing differences between the private and public markets.
Prior to comparing the differences in pricing between the private and public
regional mall REITs background information will be provided for the recent state of the
capital markets, the REIT structure and its attractiveness as an investment, a description
of regional malls and their investment value, and summaries of the four REITs that were
studied and compared.
Chapter One provides an overview of real estate capital markets. Topics examined
include capital available for investment in the 1980s, tax laws, overbuilding, deteriorating
property values, and the ultimate resurgence of REITs.
Chapter Two focuses on the characteristics of REITs. The structure's
attractiveness to property owners and investors is addressed. The UPREIT is described.
Specific attention paid to benefits provided to property owners who went public using the
UPREIT during the recent IPO boom.
Chapter Three describes regional malls. The unique qualities of this retail asset,
investment value, and typical owners are examined.
Chapter Four presents background information on two private and two public
REITs. Each REIT's holdings and strategies are analyzed.
Chapter Five presents the methodology for acquisition pricing. Acquisition
strategies of each REIT are also discussed.
Chapter Six examines differences in pricing between the private and public REITs.
Valuation of REIT portfolios in both the private and public markets are analyzed.
Calculating portfolio level capitalization rates allows for comparison of private and public
REITs.
Chapter Seven presents thesis conclusions.
CHAPTER ONE
RECENT STATE OF THE COMMERCIAL PROPERTY MARKETS
Public equity REITs provided property owners a means to recapitalize large
amounts of debt funded by private lenders during the 1980s. The excessive amounts of
capital made available for investment and development during this period prompted
overbuilding, eventually leading to considerable writedowns of property values. This
devaluation, low interest rates, and pricing differentials between the private and public
markets, enabled REITs to emerge as a favored investment vehicle in the early 1990s.
Wall Street recognized real estate operating companies as a marketable product and seized
the opportunity to recapitalize them.
The market capitalization of publicly traded real estate investment trusts (REITs)
has grown significantly since 1992. The growth of total market capitalization and the bulk
of growth in the equity sector is shown in the following chart.
Year Market Capitalization Equity REIT Share of Market Equity as % of
Total Market
1991 $12.9 billion $8.8 billion 68%
1992 $15.7 billion $11 billion 70%
1993 $32.2 billion $26.1 billion 81%
1994 $44.3 billion $38.8 billion 87.6%
Source: NAREIT, "The Complete Guide to the Real Estate Investment Trust Industry 1995."
REIT market capitalization by year end 1994 had increased by $31.4 billion from 1991's
market capitalization of $12.9 billion. Of this total increase, $30 billion has been in equity
REITs. An equity REIT typically owns interests in a specific property type.2 Factors
contributing to REIT growth are examined in this chapter.
THE 1980S AND EARLY 1990S
The rush of capital to invest in property in the 1980s was the impetus for rapid
growth in property supply which in turn drove up property values. Economic expansion
2 lbid., p. 701.
and increased demand for space, causing rents to rise, made expected real estate returns
attractive to investors.
The availability of capital was the product of a number of economic events. These
included; the 1981 Tax Act, deregulation of the banking industry, and institutional investor
interest in real estate. The Tax Act shortened depreciation schedules making real estate an
attractive tax shelter. Deregulation of the banking industry increased competition for
capital resulting in increased interest rates paid for deposits. The arrival of banks as a
source for long term real estate lending affected the historical providers of permanent
financing, insurance companies. Institutional investor interest in real estate, as a
diversification strategy to offset more volatile stock and bond investments, resulted in the
availability of additional capital. Investments were initially placed in existing properties
and eventually used to finance new development.4
The increased competition for investment in real estate caused lenders to lower
underwriting standards. Valuation of real estate assets was determined using discounted
cash flows that projected appreciation with generally optimistic underwriting assumptions.
Non-recourse debt, shorter loan terms, and increased loan to value ratios (some at greater
than 100 percent), contributed to the greater risk lenders assumed in the 1980's.
Borrowers and/or partners maintained the majority of the upside for successful properties
and lenders assumed the majority of risk if a property was unsuccessful.'
The demise of the property market was a function of two factors; the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 and the supply of real estate exceeding demand. The Tax Reform Act of
1986 lengthened depreciation schedules, increasing taxable income, and removing
attractive passive loss benefits for real estate investors. Passive losses had been utilized by
investors as a direct offset to earned income (though a property may have reported a net
loss after depreciation, cash flow may have been positive while tax benefits were realized
3 Cohen & Steers, "Real Estate Securities, Status of the U.S. Market," February 1995, p. 5.
4 Ibid., p. 5.
5 Joseph Gyourko, "The Long-Term Prospects of the REIT Market," Real Estate Review, Spring 1994, p.
43.
on the net income loss). This legislation served as a disincentive for real estate investors
and caused a significant sector of investment demand to exit the capital market.
The deterioration of property values began when the supply of real estate
exceeded demand and was further exacerbated as additional construction was completed.
Vacancies began to increase and rents began to decrease, culminating in declining property
values.
Capital withdrew from the market as real estate market conditions worsened. The
precipitous decline in property values rendered many borrowers unable to refinance loans
or sell assets to satisfy outstanding debt. The incidence of borrower default increased and
the rate of foreclosure accelerated when lenders realized the downturn was not temporary.
The Russell-NCREIF Property Index, a value weighted index of private equity real
property investments based on asset appraised values, evidences the decline in property
values. Both income and capital returns are computed and indexed to reveal relative
changes to total property returns each year. The decline peaked at -12.33% in 1991.6
From 1990 to 1992 the total index lost more than 28% of its capital value and 38% by
year end 1994.7
... in ~ ..... ... . .. .. ...
1990 1.47% 6.71% -4.99%
1991 -6.07% 6.91% -12.33%
1992 -4.34% 7.73% -11.40%
1993 0.57% 8.65% -7.58%
1994 6.73% 9.16% -2.28%
Source: Russell-NCREIF Property Index, Fourth Quarter, 1994.
6
.NCIF and Frank Russell Company, "The Russell-NCREIF Real Estate Performance Report," Fourth
Quarter 1994.
7 Total return is determined as the sum of the income and capital return divided by the appraised value of
the investment at the beginning of the year. Segregation of the income return is accomplished by dividing
only this portion by the original appraised value. The capital return is the change in the appraised value
divided by the original appraised value.
The massive devaluation of real estate prompted increased scrutiny and regulation
enforcement of lending institutions by government agencies in the 1990's. Lenders
withdrew from the market and commercial banks took significant writedowns on
mortgage values. The federal government commissioned the Resolution Trust Corporation
to manage and dispose of the accumulating problem loans of failed banks and thrifts.
Regulatory pressures forced insurance companies and banks to deal with their
problems on a short term basis. Risk based capital requirements, which demanded greater
reserves on foreclosed properties and troubled loans, provided significant disincentive for
real estate assets and mortgages to be held. Ultimately, assets were sold at steep
discounts so institutions could reduce their real estate exposure and accompanying reserve
requirements. Numerous liquidation sales of assets further depressed the property
markets.
REAL ESTATE OPERATING COMPANIES
The capital crisis in the real estate markets seriously impacted real estate operating
companies who derived profits solely from property operations. These firms had
developed numerous properties during the last three decades and continued to provide
management, leasing, and redevelopment services to their assets. Many firms were highly
leveraged and unable to refinance debt due to the lack of available capital in the private
market. Faced with the potential loss of assets and the economic benefits derived from
servicing their portfolios, owners of these companies seized the chance to recapitalize in
the public markets. The ability to rejuvenate credit lines for acquisitions and take
advantage of distressed property sales was an added benefit of becoming a publicly traded
REIT.
ARBITRAGE OPPORTUNITIES
Arbitrage opportunities resulted from the spread that could be achieved by
refinancing debt in the public market. Real estate companies that went public benefited
from public markets using lower capitalization rates to value assets. Therefore, valuation
of portfolios at the time of each companies IPO was more financially attractive than asset
sales in the private market. Properties being sold in the private market, which was
saturated with available product, were priced at capitalization rates 100 to 300 basis
points higher than the public market.8 REITs benefited because property yields were in
the eight to twelve percent range and dividend yields on REIT stocks were in the six to
eight percent range.9 Owners could purchase properties and earn returns in excess of
those commanded by investors. It was prudent for these owners to access public equity to
take advantage of positive spread investing opportunities.
Low INTEREST RATES
The interest rate environment of 1992 was extremely attractive for recapitalizing
real estate operating companies. REITs were touted as high yielding investments, which
were more attractive to investors than other investments offering lower yields and fewer
growth expectations. Investors were anxious to take advantage of these yields at year end
1992 when the prime rate was at six percent and ten year treasuries were at 6.8 percent.10
WALL STREET'S STRATEGY
In the early 1990s Wall Street was once again looking for an investment product to
sell. The investment banks, initially involved with the liquidation of property portfolios,
were eager to resolve the capital crisis. Securitization of mortgage pools became common
and the real estate investment trust was the investment vehicle chosen to recapitalize real
estate operating company holdings.
Wall Street's willingness to underwrite the conversion of these real estate
operating companies to REITs was prompted by the attributes of these firms which
provided elements of a credible growth story. The companies were internally managed
and provided all services within their firms. Certain property types, namely apartment and
8 Marissa Timm, "Report Card Taubman Centers, Inc.," Information Profits, Inc., April 28, 1994, p. 20.
9 PCA/KL & Co., "Public Real Estate Equity Securitization A Strategic Analysis," Pension Consulting
Alliance, Inc., and Kenneth Leventhal & Company, December 7, 1994, p. 27.
10 United States Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, "Annual Statistical Digest 1992," p.
162.
retail, that had maintained steady income performance through the downturn were
targeted for recapitalization in the REIT equity market.
The regional mall operating companies owned extensive portfolios of top-tier malls
and were considered extremely marketable to investors. These firms had track records
dating back over thirty years and founding principals were to remain actively involved in
REIT operations. Management's expertise was sold as a factor that would guaranty
future growth and success. Inside ownership by management, typically in the range of 20
percent to 40 percent, was to serve as a guaranty that shareholders and management's
interests would be aligned."
Wall Street was confident these firms would succeed. Improving economic
conditions and the low levels of debt in the public REITs also contributed to the
attractiveness of REITs as an investment. Economic growth was expected to result in
increased demand for real estate and increased rental rates.' 2 The low level of debt these
companies would operate with was marketed as an attribute to public REIT investment.
Leverage levels in the public market were not anticipated to exceed 50 percent, with an
industry average of approximately 30 percent. This level was significantly less than
historical leverage levels of 80 percent or more.1
Wall Street's eagerness for an investment product, the need to recapitalize private
market debt, and low interest rates provided the environment for REIT transactions to
occur. The marketing of management's expertise and involvement, superior assets, and
improving economic and property market fundamentals led to successful IPOs for real
estate operating companies. Underwriting proceeds were used to retire debt, pay
investment bankers fees, and for future acquisitions.
The following is a description of how events unfolded and interacted to create the
IPO boom of the early 1990's.
" Institutional Property Consultants, "A REIT Investment Brief," 1994, p. 8.
12 Anne E. Mengden, "Interest rates rose - So did REIT prices What was going on?" PREA Quarterly,
October 1993, p. 5.
13 Institutional Property Consultants, op. cit., p. 9.
REAL ESTATE OPERATING COMPANY IPO'S
Wall Street's involvement, the arbitrage opportunities, and the low interest rate
environment were the factors that enabled the transition of real estate operating companies
to REITs. The availability of capital and favorable pricing of assets in the public markets
made it prudent for operators to convert to the REIT operating structure. Improved
yields made REITs an attractive investment for investors.
Wall Street effectively postured real estate operating companies as high yielding
investments with growth opportunities. Investors seeking higher yields were eager to
invest and equity REITs cumulatively appreciated by more than 65% between the third
quarter of 1990 and the first quarter of 1993. Demand caused public REITs to trade at
premiums to their underlying asset values. 14
The difference in values between the markets created arbitrage opportunities for
public REITs. This arbitrage continued as interest rates remained low during most of
1993.
By the fourth quarter of 1993 interest rates began to rise, the supply of IPO
offerings outpaced demand, and acquisition opportunities for the REITs were not as
numerous or attractively priced. Prices in the REIT market decreased as yields increased.
Evidence of this fact was Simon Property Group's IPO on December 13, 1993. The IPO
was priced at $22.25 per share and offering an 8.5% yield compared to Taubman's IPO of
one year earlier at $11.00 per share, offering an eight percent yield."
Though interest rates were increasing, by the second quarter of 1994 REIT prices
rebounded due to improving economic growth expectations. Institutional investors were
also back in the market in 1994 to buy properties prompting improved asset values and
reduced spreads between the public and private markets.16
4 Ibid., p. 16.
"5 Dean Witter Reynold's, Inc., op. cit, Section 5.
16 Mueller, Pauley and Morrill, op. cit., p. 17.
The unprecedented growth of the real estate property and capital supply in the
1980s instigated the recent real estate recession. The tremendous need for a new source
of capital, to replace that unavailable from traditional private market providers, was
resolved by the public capital markets in the form of REITs. Significant growth of the
equity REITs over the last few years is a result of this migration of public capital into the
property market. Arbitrage opportunities created favorable circumstances for firms to
recapitalize and benefit from enhanced property values and positive spread investing.
These differences, though, have subsided as the economy and property markets have
improved.
In the next chapter we will examine the REIT structure and why the UPREIT
structure was more attractive to many real estate operating companies.
CHAPTER Two
THE REIT
The renewed popularity of the REIT in the early 1990s benefited owners of real
estate operating companies and investors. Owners of property were motivated to
transition to the REIT structure due to the lack of capital to refinance debt in the private
markets, realization of higher asset values in the public market, and deferral or avoidance
of tax liabilities. Investors were attracted to REIT's because of their high yields, high
dividend payout requirement, liquidity, and the ability to invest in real estate without the
expense or problems associated with direct property ownership.
This chapter will provide a brief history of REITs, characteristics of the REIT,
their attractiveness to investors, performance measures, and the UPREIT.
HISTORY OF THE REIT
REITs have existed in the United States since the 1880's, but 1960 marked the
introduction of REITs as they are known today. The Real Estate Investment Trust Act
was enacted by Congress in 1960 to facilitate investment by small investors in larger real
estate holdings through the pooling of resources.' 7 Equity REITs have been an investment
option since this time but on a significantly smaller scale than today.
From the 1960s until the mid 1970s, REITs were passive pools of capital that
invested in diversified property types. During the 1960s real estate yields were relatively
constant at 7.5 to eight percent and mortgage debt yields were in the 5.5 to seven percent
range. 18 Investors took advantage of the spread between returns that could be earned
from investment in real estate and the cost of financing.
In the 1970's mortgage REITs that issued debt securities to finance real estate
development became popular.19 Financing was accomplished by borrowing short term
17 Institutional Property Consultants, op cit., p.2.
18 PCA/KL & Co., op. cit., p. 20.
19 NatWest Securities, "REITs & Convertible Debentures: An Ideal Combination," August 9, 1994, p. 6.
money to lend on a long term basis. Trouble began when interest rates increased and an
economic recession negatively impacted REIT earnings. Many REITs discontinued
dividends and share prices crashed losing almost 75 percent of value between 1972 and
1974.20 Equity REIT investment continued to increase from 1975, though at a
constrained pace, through the 1980s. Growth peaked at $1.4 billion in 1988. During
1989 the real estate recession dampened growth and in 1990 equity REIT investment
declined by $1.2 billion.2
In 1992 the REIT emerged as a favored investment vehicle due to the attractive
interest rate environment, the need to recapitalize debt, and Wall Street's desire to resolve
the capital crisis. These factors led to explosive growth in the REIT equity sector. During
1993 equity REIT capitalization grew by $15 billion and in 1994 growth of $12.7 billion
was realized.22 Following is a description of REIT requirements and investment attributes.
REIT REQUIREMENTS
The REIT structure allows a real estate company or trust to conform to particular
tax provisions and operate as a pass-through entity. A REIT is required to distribute 95
percent of its income and any capital gains from the sale of properties to its shareholders.
Therefore, the trust is not taxed as an entity, but shareholders are taxed on dividend
income at their regular tax rate and on capital gain proceeds.2 ' To qualify as a REIT an
entity must meet requirements relating to its organization, sources of income, nature of
assets, and distributions of income to shareholders. These detailed criteria are listed in
Appendix C.
BENEFITS OF REIT INVESTMENT
Ownership of REIT shares provides numerous benefits to investors. These include
a high payout ratio, avoidance of double taxation of income derived by the trust, improved
20 PCA/KL & Co., op. cit., p. 20.
21 NAREIT, "The Complete Guide to the Real Estate Investment Trust Industry 1995," p. 852.
22 Ibid., p. 852.
23 Brueggeman and Fisher, op. cit., p. 696.
liquidity, diversification, and the ability to invest in real estate assets that may be cost
prohibitive to individual investors. The advantages of REIT investment have been
enhanced by the recent round of IPOs that have expanded the quality and selection of real
estate available for investment through REIT share ownership.
Investors are attracted by the requirement that REITs distribute 95% of net
income to shareholders, which is only taxed at the shareholder level. Investment in other
corporations are often taxed at both the corporate and shareholder level. Many REITs
distribute greater than the required amount after adjustments for non-cash expenses, such
as depreciation.
Investment liquidity is improved by the ability to trade shares on the stock
exchange and the increased market capitalization of equity REITs. REIT shares allow an
investor to move more efficiently in and out of real estate investments. Shares can be sold
more quickly than a wholly owned asset.
The ability to diversify real estate holdings and avoid the expense of direct
property ownership are additional advantages to REIT investment. The opportunity to
buy various REITs and access different property types allows improved diversification for
investors. In addition, the ability to invest in asset categories where the individual
property size and cost is prohibitive appeals to investors.
REIT INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE
Measures of performance that determine the success of a REIT include net
income, funds from operations (FFO), funds available for distribution (FAD), multiples
FFO and FAD, and the dividend payout ratio. Net income is determined by subtracting
operating expenses from revenues. It serves to establish a threshold for distributions to
shareholders, but does not accurately reflect a REITs dividend paying ability.
The effect of depreciation is incorporated into the net income calculation.
Depreciation is a non-cash expense that is charged to income to reflect use of the
economic utility of assets that derive income. A portion of an assets original cost is
charged to the current period in which the asset contributed to earnings. This charge,
though, can misrepresent the earning potential of an asset.
REIT operating performance is more accurately measured without the full effect of
historical cost depreciation. The National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts
(NAREIT), an industry organization, has prescribed FFO as a proxy to better measure
operating performance for the REIT industry. FFO is defined as:
...net income (computed accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles), excluding gains (or losses) from debt restructuring and sales of
property, plus depreciation and amortization, and after adjustments for
unconsolidated partnerships and joint ventures. Adjustments for
unconsolidated partnerships and joint ventures will be calculated to reflect
funds from operations on the same basis."2 5
Consistency in reporting FFO has and continues to be an industry issue. Specific
guidelines for the addback of depreciation and amortization have been established to
define these amounts as those that apply only to assets uniquely significant to the real
estate industry. Examples include real property depreciation, amortization of capitalized
leasing expenses, tenant allowances or improvements.2 6
FFO is further adjusted by REITs and industry analysts to reflect the amount of
cash that is available for dividends. This amount is referred to as funds available for
distribution (FAD) or cash available for distribution (CAD). FAD is calculated as FFO
less a reserve for recurring, non-revenue generating capitalized expenditures.27
The growth expectations of REITs are measured by various multiples of earnings
to share price. Industry analysts compute FFO multiples and FAD/CAD multiples to
determine the relative strength of earnings of a REIT and the comparative position to its
24 E. Richard Brownlee, Kenneth R. Ferris, and Mark E. Haskins, "Corporate Financial Reporting,"
(Boston: Irwin, 1994), p. 133.
25 NAREIT Memorandum, "Funds From Operations," February 10, 1995, p. 1.
26 Ibid., p. 3.
27 Salomon Brothers, "Understanding REIT Accounting and Disclosure Will Affect Relative Valuations,"
Salomon Brothers United States Equity Research, December 1, 1994, p. 4.
peer group. The higher the multiple the greater the growth expectation for a particular
REIT.28
The amount of FAD is compared to FFO to determine what the dividend payout
ratio is. High dividend payouts are an attractive characteristic of REITs to some
investors. The payout of a majority of cash flow to shareholders, though, can result in
under-investment in property maintenance or improvements to enhance future growth.
The sustainability of future earnings can be put at risk if reinvestment in the properties is
insufficient.
Both the characteristics of REITs and investor demand prompted the resurgence of
REIT popularity. The recapitalization of regional mall operating companies were some of
the first to take place and use of the UPREIT structure proved more attractive to owners
of these firms.
REGIONAL MALL OPERATING COMPANIES AND THE UPREIT
During the IPO boom of the early 1990's the REIT structure did not appeal to a
number of regional mall operating companies. Conversion to the REIT format required
outright sale of assets to the REIT. Properties owned for considerable lengths of time,
that had provided benefits of depreciation to owners and had low depreciable bases, would
have resulted in substantial gains and resulting tax liabilities upon sale. This issue was
circumvented through the use of the UPREIT which allowed owners to defer tax
liabilities. An additional benefit was access to operating partnership units for use in future
acquisition transactions.2 9
The REIT structure also did not accommodate business activities outside of REIT
property operations. Income derived from third party services, greater than established
levels of REIT requirements, would have jeopardized qualification as a REIT. The
UPREIT again provided for avoidance of this income recognition problem.
28 Salomon Brothers, "Introducing the Salomon Brothers Regional Mall Pricing Model," Salomon
Brothers United States Equity Research, April 1994, p. 1.29 Kaplan, Lawrence S. & Stem, Craig S., "REITs and UPREITs: Characteristics, Requirements and
Taxation, " New York, N.Y., p. 9.
THE UPREIT STRUCTURE
Alex Brown & Sons, Inc., a firm specializing in Real Estate Securities, defines an
Umbrella Partnership Real Estate Investment Trust (UPREIT) as:
An UPREIT, rather than owning a direct investment in its portfolio of
properties, owns a partnership interest in what is typically a commonly
managed multi-property partnership referred to as an Umbrella Partnership.
After paying all of the portfolio operating costs owed by the umbrella
partners, the Umbrella Partnership makes a distribution to its partners on a
pro rata basis, one of which is the REIT. The REIT in turn, will distribute
to its shareholders substantially all of its partnership distribution in the form
of a dividend after deducting administrative and public company costs.
Formation of an UPREIT involves several transactions. A property owner
contributes properties to a newly formed operating partnership in exchange for partnership
interests and the right to convert these units into REIT stock. Simultaneously, equity is
raised through a public stock offering for contribution to the partnership in exchange for a
partnership interest. Stock proceeds are then used to pay down debt on the properties and
fund acquisitions and working capital."
Once established, the General Partner of the operating partnership is the REIT
who controls partnership activities. The original property owner is typically a limited
partner in the operating partnership.
All active real estate businesses, fee based management, leasing, brokerage, and
development services are consolidated into the REIT umbrella. Two vehicles used for
accomplishing this consolidation include:
1. Formation of a taxable service company to conduct fee based businesses.
2. Creation of a partnership between the Operating Partnership and the service
33
company.
The primary goal in structuring service company relationships is to avoid violating REIT
income requirements. Other income from services provided by the real estate operating
companies would have put this in jeopardy. By only owning shares in the operating
30 Alex Brown & Sons, Real Estate Stock Monitor, September 1992.
31 Kaplan & Stem, op. cit., p. 9.
32 Ibid., p.10.
1 Ibid., p. 10.
company, the REIT is receiving dividend income. This income is subject to a 95 percent
gross income requirement, which allows dividend income, as opposed to the lower
threshold for the 75 percent gross income requirement for earned income. 4 Many real
estate operating companies formed operating partnerships to accomplish the conversion of
operating income to dividends.
The benefits of the UPREIT structure include the sponsors ability to avoid or defer
tax liabilities and the creation of operating partnership units. These units, along with
REIT shares, can be used as currency for additional acquisitions. Operating partnership
units used as currency for acquisitions provide the same tax benefits to contributors of
new property.35
A negative impact of the UPREIT structure is the inherent conflict created
between contributing partners and shareholders. Tax deferral (and accompanying lower
basis of the properties) can result in a sizable tax gain on a property sale. This situation
encourages REIT management to avoid sales that trigger deferred gains to a contributing
partner. Thus, sale of a property is avoided to protect the partner at the expense of the
shareholders.3 6 The typical REIT structure would have established a higher basis upon
acquisition of the properties avoiding a deferred tax liability.
This chapter has described REITs and the benefits to investors and operators.
REITs serve as an attractive vehicle by which investors can invest in real estate. High
payout requirements, improved liquidity, diversification benefits, the ability to invest in
assets that are cost prohibitive to single investors, and avoidance of the expense and
commitment of direct property ownership are benefits to REIT investment. The utilization
of the UPREIT structure allowed owners of property to maintain control of their assets,
access the public capital markets, continue to operate their businesses, and defer tax
liabilities to a more convenient schedule.
In Chapter Three the regional mall as an asset and investment will be examined.
34 Ibid., p. 10.
" Ibid., p. 9.
36 Ibid., p. 9.
CHAPTER THREE
THE REGIONAL MALL
Regional malls have been a favored asset of the retail property class. The large
capital required to develop, own, and operate the regional mall have made it more of a
business investment than a property investment. The complexity of the regional mall has
prompted ownership of these assets in joint ventures, partnerships, private REITs, by
institutional investors, and financing of these assets and operating companies by
institutional investors. Conversion of a large number of the regional mall operating
companies to REITs has resulted in significant numbers being owned in the public REIT
format. This chapter will describe regional malls, the reasons they are attributed with a
business value, retail factors that affect performance, and why investors are eager to own
these assets.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Since its inception in the 1950s the regional mall has been an enduring and
successful retail store concept. 7  The first regional shopping centers had one anchor
tenant and smaller satellite tenants, including grocery stores and variety stores. Many
malls were originally one level, open aired facilities that have since been redeveloped.
Malls were enclosed, expanded to two or three levels, and retenanted.3 8
During the last twenty five years regional malls have experienced the fastest
growth in sales in the retail sector while experiencing a 238% growth in square footage.:
Retail sales generated in regional malls account for 30% of total retail sales, while regional
malls comprise only 5% of the shopping center property class. 40
37 William C. Wheaton and Raymond G. Torto, "Retail Sales and Retail Real Estate," Real Estate
Finance, Spring 1995, p. 23.
3 Homart Development Company, "The Future of Regional Malls 1993-2000," January 1993.
39 Wheaton and Torto, op. cit., p. 23.
40 Douglas M. Casey and John Konarski, "A Primer for Shopping Center Institutional Investors," PREA
Quarterly, Spring 1994, p. 23.
DEFINITION OF A REGIONAL MALL
A shopping center is described as a group of commercial establishments planned,
developed, owned, and managed as a unit related in location, size, and type of shops to the
trade area the unit serves. 41  The four categories of shopping centers include;
neighborhood, community, regional, and super regional. At year end 1993, there were
39,633 shopping centers in the United States.4 2
Size and anchor composition distinguish regional malls from other retail centers.
The Urban Land Institute describes a regional shopping center, also referred to as a
regional mall, as:
"...provides for general merchandise, apparel, furniture, and home
furnishings in depth and variety, as well as a range of services and
recreational facilities. It is built around one or two full-line department
stores of generally not less than 75,000 square feet. In theory, its typical
size for definitive purposes is 450,000 square feet of gross leasable area; in
practice, it may range from 300,000 to 850,000 square feet. The regional
center is the second largest type of shopping center. As such, it provides
services typical of a business district yet not as extensive as those of the
super regional center." 4 3
A super regional center provides:
"...for extensive variety in general merchandise, apparel, furniture, and home
furnishings, as well as a variety of services and recreational facilities. It is
built around three or more full-line department stores of generally not less
than 100,000 square feet each. In theory, the typical size of a super regional
center is about 800,000 square feet of gross leasable area. In practice, the
size ranges from 600,000 to more than 1,500,000 square feet."44
The massive size of regional malls require sites that range from fifteen to one hundred or
more acres. A sales area radius that extends 12 miles with a customer base greater than
41Urban Land Institute, Dollars & Cents of Super Community Shopping Centers: 1993, Washington D. C.,
p.4 .
42 International Council of Shopping Centers, "The Scope of the Shopping Center Industry in the United
States 1994," p. 3.
43 Urban Land Institute, op. cit., p.4.
44 Ibid., p.4.
300,000 persons, each willing to travel 30 minutes from their point of origin, are typical
attributes.
The significant investment and need to coordinate owner and anchor
responsibilities require the existence of operating and supplementary agreements. An
operating agreement is a publicly recorded, legally binding document that defines the
rights of the developer and anchor to act independently in using their land. The agreement
establishes the common goal of implementing the planning, development, and management
of a group of commercial establishments as one unit. A supplemental agreement defines
the financial agreements between a developer and each anchor concerning development
and operation. The financial and operational responsibilities and contributions of each
party to the agreement are described. 4 6
As of December 1993, there were 1,863 shopping centers in the United States with
square footage in excess of 400,000 square feet. A total of 669 with area in excess of
800,000 square feet and 374 with greater than 1,000,000 square feet.4 7 Regional malls, as
defined in this paper, include both regional and super regional malls.
BusINEss VALUE OF THE REGIONAL MALL
The operational complexity of the regional mall contributes to its value, often
referred to as business value. Business value is a function of the mall's size, operational
aspects, and the need to constantly adjust to consumer demands to ensure success of the
mall. 48
Essential attributes of the mall that maximize business value include location in a
trade area with a large population base that is relatively affluent, mall size, and anchor
45 James D. Vernor and Joseph Rabianski, Shopping Center Appraisal andAnalysis, Illinois, Appraisal
Institute, 1993, pp. 6-9.
46 Vern Tessier, "The Valuation of Regional and Super-regional Malls," Assessment Digest,
September/October 1991, p. 5.
47 Urban Land Institute, op. cit., p.4.
48 Jeffrey D. Fisher, "Valuation Techniques for the Private Real Estate Market," Indiana University School
of Business.
quality.49 Location of the mall on a high profile, easily accessible site is crucial. The mall
should be the only one in its trade area. If not, it should be significantly larger than its
competitors in order to capture sufficient market share. Trade area health and quality and
a sufficient population base are key components to achievement of high sales levels. At
minimum, the strongest three anchors in the market should be in the mall."
The capital and operational demands of regional malls serve to constrain
development. The planning and significant investment required prior to development has
successfully limited overbuilding of the property type and enhances the value of existing
malls. Decisions to develop are constrained by the following:
1. Required commitments from three or more anchors, typically a major department
store, who feel a sufficient market exists for their merchandise.
2. The expense of constructing regional malls.
3. Cumbersome development processes, which involve large scale land assembly and
local government involvement in the development process, magnify the time and
commitment required for project approval and completion."
The existence of these barriers to entry further enhance the value of existing regional
malls.
OWNERSHIP OF REGIONAL MALLS
The substantial investment that is required to own and finance regional malls and
the complexity of operations has put these assets in an elite ownership class. Often mall
ownership is accomplished through the pooling of investor funds. The primary owners of
regional malls include; institutional investors, private and public REITs, regional mall
development and operating companies, insurance companies, and some wealthy
individuals. 2
The UPREIT format has allowed the restructuring of a number of regional mall
developers' portfolios and operating companies to convert their ownership to the REIT
49 Homart Development Company, op. cit.
50 Ibid.
51 Heitman Financial, Ltd., op. cit., p. 11-3.
52 L.J. Melody & Company and Arthur Andersen Real Estate Services Group, "Regional Malls,"
November 1992, p. 63.
format. As of November 1994 eight initial public offerings (IPO's) for regional mall
companies were completed." Some of these firms included Taubman Centers, Simon
Property Group, General Growth Properties, Urban Shopping Centers, DeBartolo Realty
and the MaceRich Company. 4
Today it is estimated that 22% of the premier super regional malls are owned by
publicly traded REITs." Total capitalization of the public retail REIT sector as of May
31, 1995, was $43.5 billion. REITs specializing in regional malls account for $4.9 billion
of this total. 6
A number of regional malls are owned by private REITs. Private REIT shares are
held by institutional investors and avoid public reporting and disclosure requirements. The
largest REIT in the United States is a private REIT, Corporate Property Investors. Its
market capitalization is approximately $4 billion. "
The popularity of the regional mall asset class and the limited stock of superior
regional malls generally results in relatively low capitalization rates. Capitalization rates
are presently in the seven to eight percent range while some trade at lower rates.58 The
recent return of conventional lenders to the private markets has contributed to lowering
capitalization rates for high quality regional malls.5 9
Transactions in the regional mall sector have been minimal due to the lack of
available quality product. Therefore, when an acceptable mall is made available the
competitive market prices the product aggressively. The availability of regional mall
assets is also constrained by the ownership of these assets in REITs. Many of the newly
formed public REITs will not sell their mall holdings due to the tax liabilities that would be
" Jonathan Litt, "The Mall Is Dead? Not!" ICSC Quarterly, Fall 1994, p. 16.
1 Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., op. cit., Section 5.
55 Invesco, Mall Equity REITs: An Institutional Investor Overview, Industry Paper, Fall, 1994, p. 2..
56 Salomon Brothers Real Estate Securities, "May 1995 Review," Salomon Brothers United States Real
Estate Research, June 1995, p. 4.
5 Tom Zacharias, Corporate Property Investors, Interview, July 11, 1995.
58 Peter F. Korpacz, "REIT Appetite Impacts Retail Property Market," Real Estate Capital Markets
Report, Winter 1995, p. 10.
59 Jinny St. Goar, "Going the non-REIT route," Institutional Investor, November 1994, p. 155.
realized upon sale. 60 Also, to qualify as a REIT there is a stipulation that an asset cannot
be traded within four years of acquisition. Both of these factors contribute to the
likelihood that regional malls will not be actively traded assets.
PERFORMANCE AS AN INVESTMENT
Strong income and relatively stable value have made the regional mall a preferred
asset for investment in real estate. A comparison of the Russell-NCREIF Property Index
Total Return to that of the retail property sector over the last thirteen years shows that
retail returns, until 1994, had exceeded the Total Property Return.
NCREIF Total Return vs Retail Retum
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The retail sector has achieved stable income returns in the six to seven percent range with
capital declines during the recent real estate recession. 61 The erosion of capital value for
the retail property group was much less than that of other property types during this same
period. The regional mall, as a portion of the retail property type, has been further
insulated from the erosion of capital value due to the long term nature of its cash flows
and prime locational characteristics.6
60Ei J. Savitz, "The REIT Maze Picking a Safe Path Through a Hot Group," Barron's, May 24, 1993, p.
22.
61 NCREIF and Frank Russell Company, op. cit.
62 Heitman Financial, Ltd., op. cit., p. I-1.
Cash flow security is a function of the long-term nature of tenant leases and
additional surety provided by the ability to pass operating expense increases on to the
tenant. Further security is provided by the long-term commitment of anchors and the fact
that a majority of mall tenants are economically strong national operators.
TRENDS AND OUTLOOKS
Economic forecasts project long term growth in personal income in the 2-2.5%
range and retail sales growth in the 1- 1.5% range (in constant dollars).63  Therefore,
constraint in the increase in supply of regional mall space should provide for continued
success in this sector for top-tier regional malls. The present trend in the mall industry is
for owners to expand and rehabilitate existing product, with minimal new development
planned.
The International Council of Shopping Centers, a retail trade organization, tracks
planned retail development. Development of 14 regional malls is anticipated over the next
few years. Total square footage in these malls is estimated to be 12.9 million square feet,
with a geographic concentration in the southern United States.64
Following are brief descriptions of regional mall tenants, retail demand and retail
sales.
RETAIL TENANTS
The financial success of regional malls is contingent on tenant sales. These tenants
include anchors, national retailers, concept stores, and regional and local retailers. All
contribute to the health of each other and total mall productivity.
Many anchors experienced financial difficulties during the late 1980s and early
1990s which negatively impacted regional mall operations. The department store chains
were overleveraged and fell victim to these unmanageable debt levels and slow economic
63 Wheaton and Torto, op. cit., p. 30.
64 Michael Tubridy, International Council of Shopping Centers, Interview, July 31, 1995.
growth.65  Outlet malls, discounters, and value oriented merchants were able to take
market share from regional malls. Some of the department stores recovered from this
struggle through consolidations and restructurings during the early 1990s. The result was
stronger re-emerging anchors who could compete with other retail formats.66
The 1980s saw the emergence of concept stores. These are specialty stores of
large retailers that serve a small merchandise segment at a particular price point.
Examples of concept stores include the Gap (Banana Republic, Gap, and Gap Kids) and
The Limited (Abercrombie & Fitch, Express, Limited, and Structure, and Victoria's
Secrets).67 These retailers have been successful and continue to command expansion
space, having positive implications for continued rental rate and income growth. It is not
unusual for five to six stores per mall to be leased to these concept store entities. The
concept stores and their locational preferences serve as a barometer for many mall owners
when they are determining whether to acquire or develop a mall.
Regional and local retailers occupy mall shop space and provide substantial cash
flow for malls. The success of smaller retailers is dependent upon anchor health and the
number of consumers that are attracted to the mall.
RETAIL DEMAND
Retail demand is predicated on changes in population, retail sales patterns, general
economic strength, and behavioral choices of consumers. All of these factors must be
monitored and adjusted for by regional mall operators to assure continued success.
Expected population growth is anticipated to be half the pace of the 1970's and
1980's resulting in fewer consumers. In addition, aging baby boomers and their changing
spending habits, the occurrence of more single parent homes, and anticipated population
growth (25% of which will be attributable to immigration), are all expected to impact
65 Heitman Financial, Ltd., op. cit., p. IV-1.
6 6 Ibid., p. IV-2.
67 Ibid., p. IV-2.
current and future retail sales. The implication of fewer consumers will likely lead to the
need for fewer retail stores and ultimately malls. 68
RETAIL SALES
Despite changes in demand the health of regional mall sales continues to be strong.
ICSC data shows a significant increase in average expenditures per mall visit and a
decrease in the amount of time per visit. Average expenditures grew from $40.41 to
$54.10 per visit between 1986 and 1992, with a decrease in time spent in malls from 75
minutes to 72 minutes for the same period.69  Seventy percent of the adult population
shops at regional malls with an average of four visits per month.70 Shopping center sales
increased 5.5 percent in 1993, up from 5.3 percent in 1992. These statistics bode well for
the regional mall's ability to adjust to changing demands of consumers.
Department store sales grew 7.9 percent in 1994, exceeding the average, while
apparel stores only experienced a 1.9% increase. 71 The recapture of sales, lost in recent
years by department stores, has been achieved with increased emphasis on affordable and
fashionable clothing. The impact of this trend, though, may hurt other traditional mall
72tenants. Historically 45% of regional mall space has been dedicated to apparel. Apparel
space is now being reduced due to the declining level of sales, particularly for women's
clothing.
Retail sales are the most crucial element of a malls financial success. Sales levels
serve as a measure for potential mall tenants, to determine if they want to locate in a
specific mall, and serve as a basis for establishing tenant rental rates. High per square foot
sales are the primary reason retail tenants desire to be in a particular mall. Malls with high
sales levels deliver consumers that will enhance each tenant's profitability, which is crucial
because mall tenants can provide over 90 percent of total mall revenue.73
6 8 Ibid., p. IV-2.
69 Diane M. Kutyla, The Winds Of Change in Retailing, ICSC Research Quarterly, May 1994, p. 7.
70 International Council of Shopping Centers, op. cit., p. 2.
71 International Council of Shopping Centers, op. cit., p. 1.
72 The Russell-NCREIF Real Estate Performance Report, Fourth Quarter 1994, p. 7.
73 Taubman Centers, Inc., 1994 Annual Report, p. 24.
High per square foot sales allow mall owners to charge higher rents than less
successful malls. Tenants in malls with lucrative sales are able to pay a greater percentage
of occupancy costs. Total occupancy costs consist of minimum rents, percentage rents,
and recoverable expenses.74 All of the regional mall REITs express their rents, which
equate to mall tenant occupancy costs, as a percentage of mall tenant sales. Top-tier
regional malls with high sales levels command greater rents and a higher percentage of
occupancy costs as a percent of sales.
OUTLOOK FOR REGIONAL MALLS
Successful regional mall operators will monitor income and demographic
projections and adjust existing tenant mixes to maintain market share. These changes are
anticipated to result in 15 percent to 20 percent reductions in the number of regional
malls by the end of the decade. Premier regional malls with strong operations will benefit.
Less competitive malls will falter and leave customers to be absorbed by the stronger
malls.
The regional mall's position as a premier retail asset and its ability to produce cash
flow with long-term security continue to make this property type attractive to investors.
The opportunity to enhance property value through remerchandising and redevelopment
efforts are additional reasons mall assets are in great demand. In the next chapter we will
examine four REITs that collectively own 116 regional malls.
14 bid., p. 24.
15 Heitman Financial, Ltd., op. cit., p. IV-7.
CHAPTER FOUR
DESCRIPTION OF Two PRIVATE AND Two PUBLIC REITs
A comparison of private and public markets must begin with comparable
information. The examination of four regional malls will exhibit the operational
similarities of private and public REITs. The two private REITs are Corporate Property
Investors (CPI) and Retail Property Trust (RPT). The two public REITs are Simon
Property Group (SPG) and Taubman Centers, Inc. (TCO).
All four of the REITs have provided annual reports and a REIT representative was
interviewed. CPI and RPT were suggested for study by Institutional Property
Consultants, a consulting firm servicing institutional investors in real estate, who
recommended this thesis topic. Taubman Centers was selected due to the quality of its
regional mall portfolio. Simon Property Group was selected due to its significant market
capitalization and the fact that over 75% of its revenues are derived from regional mall
assets.
My research methodology involved interviewing REIT representatives and analysts
and reviewing annual reports, analyst reports, and IPO prospectuses. Some REIT
representatives were eager to address all areas of operations and strategy while others felt
certain information was proprietary. Therefore, I have attempted to provide consistent
information for all of the REITs.
The characteristics that will be examined for each REIT include; organization,
capital structure, portfolio characteristics, investment strategy, and performance.
Performance measures were taken from the annual reports, if available, and calculated if
not available and sufficient information was provided to do so.
CORPORATE PROPERTY INVESTORS
Organization
Corporate Property Investors (CPI), a private REIT, is the largest REIT in the
United States. The REIT was organized in 1971 with an initial capitalization of $75
million to invest in properties net leased to credit worthy corporations. Three former
employees of Lazard Freres, an investment banking firm specializing in real estate
transactions, formed the REIT.
CPI acquired its first regional shopping centers in 1972 from Edward J. DeBartolo
Company, a shopping center developer. Interests in five midwestern regional shopping
centers were acquired and initiated their involvement in the redevelopment and
management of shopping centers. 6 These activities have continued through acquisition
and development in suburbs of major cities such as New York, Atlanta, Boston, and
Minneapolis.77
CPI is self-managed. All leasing, property management, development
management, construction management, supervision of independent on-site managers,
financial, and a substantial portion of legal activities are performed in-house. Shareholders
are predominantly institutional investors; U.S. pension funds (46%), offshore government
entities (22%), offshore financial institutions (23%), and offshore international pension
funds (five percent). Individuals, trustees, and officers own four percent. 8 Institutional
owners include the pension funds of AT&T, U.S. Steel, Exxon, Nynex, the World Bank,
General Motors, the Ford Foundation, the United Nations, and the State of
Pennsylvania.79
76 Tom Zacharias, Corporate Property Investors, Inc., Interview, July 10, 1995.
77 Corporate Property Investors, 1994 Information Brochure, p. 19.
78 Ibid., p. 33.
7 9 Michael Liebowitcz and Michael Vachon, "CPI makes its 144A mark despite industry gloom,"
Investment Dealers Digest, March 23, 1993, p. 23.
Capital Structure
Capital is primarily raised through periodic private placements of shares. Existing
shareholders have preemptive rights before CPI searches for new investors. Equity
capital, totaling $1.6 billion, has been sourced sixteen times during the last twenty-four
years. The public bond market has also been used to raise capital. In 1992 a $250 million
debt offering was issued. Ninety percent of the offering was purchased by institutional
investors, mostly state and corporate pension funds. The issue, priced at 168 basis points
over comparable treasuries, was oversubscribed and therefore considered extremely
successful. CPI debt issues have been consistently rated Al by Moody's and AA- by
Standard & Poors Corporation.
Following is a summary balance sheet as of December 31, 1994 (in 000's):
Real Estate Assets $1,571,756
Other Assets $512,792
Total Debt $763,531
Property Level Debt $69,580
Company Level Debt $693,951
Net Worth $1,198,482
Shares Outstanding 21,157
Source: Corporate Property Investors 1994 Annual Report
Capital Ratios:
Debt to Equity 23.9%
Property Debt to 20.6%
Equity
Current Ratio 3.42
Source: Corporate Property Investors 1994 Annual Report
Portfolio Characteristics
The portfolio is comprised of 26 super-regional shopping centers, five office
buildings, one hotel, and one mixed use property. Total portfolio value is approximately
$4 billion. Gross leasable area in malls is 29.4 million square feet.' Mall square footage
80 Corporate Property Investors, 1994 Annual Report, p. 16.
ranges from 695,000 to 2,100,000 square feet. The malls contribute 90% of total
81
portfolio revenues.
Property Type Number of Assets GLA or Units Mall Shop GLA
Regional Mall 26 29,405,000 14,810,000
Office 5 2,385,000 n/a
Hotel 1 375 rooms n/a
Mixed Use 1 Hotel, retail & office n/a
Shopping centers are located in; Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida,
Georgia, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, and South Carolina. Office
buildings are located in Georgia, New Jersey, and New York. The hotel is located in
Georgia and the mixed use in Massachusetts. Thirteen malls are owned with 100% interest
and thirteen more are held in joint partnerships. CPI's interest in these partnerships range
from 15 percent to 62 percent.82
CPI's goal is to improve the "geographic coherence" and average asset quality of
the portfolio. Three centers with average sales of $230 per square foot, far below CPI's
$340 desired sales level, were sold in December of 1994. Sales in expanded malls, which
in square footage is approximately equivalent to those sold, are expected to average $465
per square foot. Conversion of low productivity space to higher sales per square foot will
continue to be a primary objective of the REIT. 3
Redevelopments and expansions have and continue to be substantial in CPI's
portfolio. Five centers are being expanded or redeveloped. These projects will result in
three new anchors and 575,000 additional square feet of mall space.84 Expansions should
be completed by 1999.85
Investment Strategy
CPI's investment focus is on acquiring property whose value can be enhanced
through expansion, redevelopment, and remerchandising. Consolidating ownership
81 Tom Zacharias, op. cit.
82 Ibid., p. 14.
8 3 Ibid., p. 5.
8 4 Ibid., p. 11.
85 Bill Lyons, Corporate Property Investors, Interview, July 7, 1995.
interests in certain regional malls through the acquisition of minority interests is also a goal
of the REIT.86
New retail investment strategies have been researched. One was a mall with
discount retailers as anchors. However, their investors have preferred they maintain a
focused retail investment strategy. Investors view diversification into other retail formats
as disadvantageous. CPI sees consolidation of regional mall companies as a source of
cash flow growth for members of the retail real estate industry, similar to the recent
consolidation of retailers that has taken place. Their goal is to examine all realistic
opportunities which would not compromise CPI's asset quality. 7
Performance
CPI's performance has improved over the last year. Total return has improved by
almost four percent.
Measure 1993 1994
Share Price $134.15 $133.14
Capital Return -3.94% -0.78%
Income Return 4.96% 5.89%
Total Return 1.02% 5.11%
FFO n/a n/a
FAD $6.86 $7.14
Dividends $6.92 $7.90
Payout ratio as % of 100.1% 107.5%
FFO
Occupancy 91.7% 93.3%
Sales per SF $335 $341
Occupancy Costs as a 13% 13%
% of sales per SF I
Source: Corporate Property Investors 1994 Annual Report
CPI has continued to recognize small capital losses to property value but income
returns have increased to almost six percent. Occupancy has also improved by 1.6% to
93.3%. Sales at $341 per square foot are the strongest of the four REITs examined.
Dividends include return of capital for dispositions, the reason dividends exceed funds
86 Ibid., p. 2.
87 Ibid., p. 8.
available for distribution. The following performance summary exhibits CPI's dividend
and return history.
10 Year Performance Summary
Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Dividend $5.15 $5.73 $6.10 $6.25 $6.45 $6.80 $6.90 $6.90 $6.90 $7.90
Total % 16.27 19.93 23.85 13.44 14.77 9.76 -2.24 -3.48 1.02 5.11
Rate of
Return
Source: Corporate Property Investors 1994 Information Brochure
RETAIL PROPERTY TRUST
Organization
The Retail Property Trust (RPT) is a private REIT that invests in regional malls
and community shopping centers. RPT was formed in 1986 to invest in Shopping Center
Associates ("SCA") which acquires and owns interests in retail properties. SCA is a joint
partnership between RPT and O'Connor Retail Partners L.P.(ORP). RPT owns
approximately 99% of SCA and ORP is the general partner and owns the remaining one
percent.
The O'Connor Group, an investment management firm for institutional investors,
is the manager of the REIT and directs all investment decisions. The REIT's initial capital,
$260 million, was provided by six outside minority shareholders with whom the principals
had established long-term relationships. Current shareholders are primarily pension funds,
along with a small number of foundations and endowments. 9
88 Retail Property Trust 1994 Annual Report, p. 25.
89 Bruce MacLeod, Retail Property Trust, Interview, July 19, 1995.
Capital Structure
Follow-on offerings in late 1988 and increased the fund to nearly $1 billion from its
original market capitalization of $260 million. 90 RPT is presently fully invested and not
sourcing new capital. RPT attained an A debt rating in 1992 which has been maintained.9'
Following is a summary balance sheet as of December 31, 1994 (in 000's):
Real Estate Assets $651,648
Other Assets $349,574
Total Debt $277,843
Property Level Debt $128,500
Company Level Debt $149,343
Net Worth $696,312
Shares Outstanding 38,376
Source: Retail Property Trust 1994 Annual Report.
Capital Ratios:
Debt to Equity 31%
Property Debt to 28.3%
Equity
Current Ratio 2
Source: Retail Property Trust 1994 Annual Report.
Portfolio Characteristics
The REIT owns 11 regional centers and four community shopping centers in six
markets; New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Memphis, Fort Meyers and Pittsburgh. The
portfolio totals 11.4 million square feet with a current appraised value of approximately
$923 million.9 2 Following are the portfolio characteristics:
Property Type Number of Assets Total GLA Mall Shop GLA
Regional Mall 11 10,751,000 5,982,000
Community 4 683,000 683,000
Center
Source: Retail Property Trust 1994 Annual Report
Square footage in the centers ranges from 129,000 square feet in the smallest shopping
center to 1,480,000 square feet in the largest regional mall. RPT shares interests in seven
90 The O'Connor Group, Company information package.
91 Ibid.
92 Retail Property Trust 1994 Annual Report, p. 15.
of the properties with joint venture partners. Six are owned with a 50 percent interest and
one a 40 percent interest. One of these projects is a development joint venture.9 3
Bruce MacLeod, President of RPT stated,
"RPT's operating strategy is to buy properties that have repositioning
opportunities and this has required a tremendous amount of capital
investment and disruption of cash flows each year. 1996 will be the first year
of stabilized cash flow." 94
All of the portfolio properties have had renovations except two, which will be completed
in 1995 and 1996. It is anticipated that no major capital expenditures will be required for
a number of years. Therefore, the full benefit of these redevelopment's cash flows should
impact future earnings.
Five properties were remerchandised or renovated in 1994. Mall space was
expanded by 80,000 square feet and some previous anchor positions were redeveloped as
mall space and food courts. 95
RPT emphasizes merchandising to find the right tenants to attract the correct
customer base to their malls. Their present strategy is to reduce the percentage of selling
area dedicated to women's apparel and focus on better performing retailers in this retail
group, such as Ann Taylor and Talbots. Increases will appear in space dedicated to hard
goods, food, entertainment, and services. One example is The Westchester, a new
development, where 15 percent of gross leasable area is dedicated to hard goods, whereas
this allocation would have been five to seven percent five years ago.96
RPT is also planning to dispose of Mission Center and Sherwood Gardens, two
assets located in California. These assets were acquired in November of 1989 in a
portfolio purchase. The original strategy was to dispose of these.
9 Ibid. p. 29.
94 Bruce MacLeod, op. cit.
95 Retail Property Trust 1994 Annual Report, p. 25.
96 Ibid., p. 3.
Investment Strategy
RPT's investment strategy is to acquire and revitalize quality regional malls. Their
goal is an initial attractive return with potential for adding value. RPT, though fully
invested, does analyze malls that come on the market and are of the caliber of product
they desire.
Performance
RPT's overall performance has improved during 1994. The significant funds used
to redevelop and expand portfolio properties has tempered income returns. The impact of
increased income is expected to be fully realized as projects are completed within the next
few years.
Measure 1993 1994
Share Price $18.19 $17.67
Capital Return -3.22% -2.86%
Income Return 5.05% 5.28%
Total Return 1.83% 2.42%
FFO $1.07 $1.07
Dividends $0.95 $0.96
Payout Ratio as % 88.8% 89.7%
of FFO
Occupancy 88.0% 89.8%
Sales per SF $245 $285
Occupancy Cost as 8% 8%
% of sales per SF I
Source: Retail Property Trust 1994 Annual Report
RPT's total return in 1994 improved slightly over 1993's by .6%. Capital erosion
has declined and income returns are increasing. Funds from operations remained at the
same level but the dividend was increased by one cent. Occupancy has improved by one
percent to almost 90 percent. Sales per square foot has increased drastically due to newly
renovated mall space. RPT's relatively low occupancy cost level of eight percent
provides potential for improvement in rental rates compared to higher occupancy costs for
the other REITs.
SIMON PROPERTY GROUP
Organization
Simon Property Group (SPG) is the largest publicly traded regional mall REIT.
Formed in December of 1993, SPG owns a 56.4% stake and is the General Partner of the
Operating Partnership of the Simon Property Group, Limited Partnership. Melvin Simon,
Herbert Simon, other affiliates, and third party investors exchanged partnership interests in
certain shopping centers and the management, development, and leasing activities related
to the properties for limited partnership interests in the Operating Partnership. 97 The
Operating Partnership is involved in the ownership, operation, management, leasing,
acquisition, expansion and development of real estate properties, its primary focus being
on regional malls and shopping centers.
Total square footage of the Operating Partnership's portfolio is 58 million square
feet. In 1994 it generated $8.5 billion dollars in retail sales. Combined with its affiliated
management company, the total management portfolio is 71 million square feet.98 The
portfolio is nationally diversified and offers a range of retail store types that also provide
diversification for investors.
The Simon brothers, Melvin and Herbert, began developing retail centers in the
early 1960's. Since that time they have successfully developed a number of different retail
property types; regional malls, power centers, and specialty retail centers. They are
recognized for their success in pioneering the integration of entertainment with the retail
shopping environment.
Capital Structure
Public Offerings
SPG completed its IPO on December 13, 1993, realizing net proceeds of $966
million. Concurrently SPG also borrowed $259 million in a private financing transaction.
97 Simon Property Group 1994 Annual Report, p. 36.
9 Ibid., p. 36.
The proceeds of equity and debt were used to repay existing debt of $986 million,
repurchase interests in property partnerships, acquire development land, and establish a
working capital reserve. SPG is 93.1% owned by public shareholders and 6.9% by The
Simons.99 Simon inside ownership of the operating partnership is 42.5%.100
A secondary offering was sold in April of 1995 which raised $137 million.
Proceeds were used to repay bank credit lines which had been used for acquisitions.' 0 '
Shareholders in the REIT include approximately 50% of both institutional and
retail investors. Mutual funds invested heavily at the time of the IPO but have since been
replaced by pension fund money. State pension funds include Ohio, Wisconsin, and
Florida. Fidelity Investments, an investment manager, also owns two million shares. 0 2
Following is a summary balance sheet as of December 31, 1994 (in 000's):
Real Estate Assets $1,829,111
Other Assets $448,117
Total Debt $1,938,091
Property Level Debt $1,738,592
Company Level Debt $199,139
Net Worth $101,693
Shares Outstanding 45,212
Source: Simon Property Group 1994 Annual Report.
Capital Ratios:
Debt to Equity 66.5%
Property Debt to 59.2%
Equity
Current Ratio 2.3
Source: Simon Property Group 1994 Annual Report.
Portfolio Characteristics
The Operating Partnership's current portfolio consists of 59 regional malls, 55
community shopping centers, 2 specialty retail centers, and three mixed-use properties
located throughout the United States with a focus in the mid-west and central states.
99 CS First Boston, Simon Property Group, July 28, 1995, p.7 .
100 Green Street Advisors, Inc. Research, Simon Property Group, Inc., April 24, 1995, p. 11.
101 Ibid., p. 1.
102 Steve Sterrett, Vice President Financial Planning & Treasurer, Simon Property Group, Interview, July
28, 1995.
Property Type Number of Assets Square Footage
Regional Mall 59 44,900,000
Shopping Center 55 11,900,000
Specialty Retail & Mixed Use 5 1,500,000
Source: Simon Property Group 1994 Annual Report
SPG is involved with a number of new developments. Four regional malls, three in
joint ventures, are currently being developed in the United States. Three will be
completed in the fall of 1995 and another in 1996. All of these are expected to affect cash
flow in 1997. Their most recent flagship developments include The Forum Shops at
Caesar's, in Las Vegas, and The Mall of America, in Bloomington, Minnesota. A 60%
interest in the Forum Shops is part of the REIT security and management fees from Mall
Of America are part of the management companies contribution to the Operating
Partnership, although the property is not a property of the Operating Partnership.
Expansion projects at existing malls, at a cost totaling $41 million, will add two
anchors and 80,000 square feet of new mall shop space. Also the Forum Shops at
Caesar's, with $1100 per square foot sales, is to be expanded by 200,000 square feet at a
cost of $90 million. 0 3
In addition to development in the United States, SPG is also developing malls in
Mexico with joint venture partners. Three regional malls in the Mexico City area and one
in Guadalajara, totaling 4 million square feet, are to be completed in 1995 and 1996. The
Simons Operating Partnership is contributing development management expertise and
providing relationships with United States retailers, with no cash contributed. The
Operating Partnership's interest will be 24% ownership interest as a joint venture partner
and development and leasing fees.104 Returns on two of these projects are subordinated to
the preferred returns of the money partner. An 11-12% unleveraged return on costs are
expected. 15
103 Green Street Advisors, Inc. Research, Simon Property Group, Inc., op. cit.
104 Kemper Securities, Inc. Real Estate Research, Initiating Coverage Simon Property Group, Inc., April
11, 1994, p. 5.
105 Steve Sterrett, op. cit.
The Simons have established a separate relationship with a pension fund to develop
and operate power centers. In addition to development and leasing fees SPG receives a
35% ownership interest, after a preferred return is paid to the pension fund. The pension
fund contributes the total original investment.' 0 6
Another retail development opportunity being considered are unanchored specialty
centers. These range in size from 100,000 to 150,000 square feet. Prospective tenants
are typical mall shops. Examples include; Eddie Bauer, Gap, Limited, and Barnes &
Noble Bookstores. The attraction of these centers is the convenience of shopping in a
smaller "mall" close to home. This property type derives mall cash flow (ninety percent of
regional mall revenues are provided by mall tenants) from a smaller center while
minimizing expenditures of a larger mall. 107
SPG actively acquired assets in 1994. In September SPG acquired MSA Realty, a
small public REIT the Simons had previously sponsored. The acquisition increased their
interest to 100%, from 50%, in fourteen power centers. A 50% interest in a regional mall
was also acquired. The transaction involved the exchange of 1.8 million shares of SPG
common stock and assumption of $145 million of mortgage debt. SPG also acquired four
regional malls, totaling three million square feet, in December of 1994. Three of these
malls were acquired from CPI. 18 Capitalization rates on these malls were estimated in the
9-9.5% range by SPG.'09 CPI estimated the sale capitalization rate to be in the 8.5 to 9%
range."1
Investment Strategy
SPG's mission statement is;
To be the dominant developer, owner, and manager of retail real estate in
North America through the creation and enhancement of a high-quality
portfolio of properties."'
106 Kemper Securities, Inc. Real Estate Research, op. cit., p. 5.
107 Steve Sterrett, op. cit.
108 Simon Property Group, Inc. 1994 Annual Report, p. 2.
109 Steve Sterrett, op. cit.
10 Tom Zacharias, op. cit.
"' Steve Sterrett, op. cit.
SPG aspires to provide service across the full spectrum of retail product. 1 2 The stated
goal in 1994 was to enhance and grow the portfolio through development of new retail
projects, acquisitions of properties, and expanding and renovating new properties.
As evidenced by the considerable development they are engaging in, SPG is
actively growing. The structure of their ventures with partners and the variety of product
they are involved in shows their more conservative approach and willingness to share both
risks and profits.
Performance
SPG realized the expectations they established for their firm and, more
importantly, the expectations Wall Street had established for their first year operating as a
public company. Their stock has performed strongly and the market seems confident their
growth expectations can be achieved.
Measure 1993 1994
Share Price 22 5/8 24 1/4
Capital Return 1.7% 7.2%
Income Return n/a 8.4%
Total Return 1.69% 15.58%
FFO $1.92 $2.09
Dividends n/a $1.90
Dividend Payout as a n/a 90.9%
% of FFO
Occupancy 85.6% 86.2%
Sales per SF $279 $276
Occupancy Costs as 10.2% 10.4%
% of Sales per SF
Source: Simon Property Group 1994 Annual Report
It is estimated over 76% of portfolio revenues are derived from SPG's regional
mall holdings." 3 Total return of 15.58% and increased FFO of $.17 exhibit their
operating success. Sales volume in the mall portfolio increased 2.1% to $5.2 billion in
1994 from $5.1 billion in 1993.
112 Steve Sterrett, op. cit.
113 Penobscot Group, Inc., "Real Estate Stock IPO Review Simon Property Group," December 8, 1993. p.
5.
SPG's successful performance is exhibited, in the following chart, by their
increased stock price and decreased required yield since their IPO.
Stock Performance Since IPO
Date Price Dividend Yield
December 13, 1993 22 1/4 8.5%
May 31, 1995 24 7/8 7.9%
Source: Dean Witter's Equity REIT Monthly Statistical Review
TAUBMAN CENTERS, INC.
Organization
Taubman Centers, Inc., (TCO), became a publicly traded REIT on November 20,
1992. Taubman was the first regional mall developer and operator to utilize the UPREIT
structure to source capital in the public markets. TCO is the managing general partner of
the Taubman Realty Group Limited Partnership (TRG) and owns a 35.1% interest. TRG
owns, operates, develops, and acquires regional and super regional malls throughout the
United States. In addition to TCO's 35.1% ownership others who own a portion of TRG
include the Taubman Group (22.29%), the GM Pension Trusts (3 9.87%), and former joint
venture partners (2.74%).114
Taubman owns the top quality regional mall portfolio in the country. Green Street
Advisors, a REIT research firm, describes the quality of their mall holdings as superior to
any other REIT portfolio in the country as measured by average size, sales per mall, and
sales per square foot."'
In the early 1960's Alfred Taubman and a number of associates began their
regional mall development, ownership, and management business. The Taubman company
formed in 1973 to develop, own, and operate regional shopping malls. Until 1985 each
114 Taubman Centers, Inc. 1994 Annual Report, p.48.
15 Green Street Advisors, Inc., Taubman Centers, Inc., May 22, 1995, p. 3.
mall was individually owned and capitalized at the property level. Alfred Taubman had
equity in each property partnership in conjunction with one partner per property.
Taubman Realty Group was formed in 1985 to consolidate and own 100 percent
interest in these seventeen regional malls. The Taubman family collectively owned 75
percent of the TRG partnership. General Motors (GM), through its pension fund trust,
loaned the new TRG entity $625 million and acquired an option to purchase a 50 percent
partnership interest in TRG. After the initial transaction, AT&T purchased an 8.2 percent
participation in the GM loan and option.116
In December of 1991 members of TRG felt limitations of the original business
structure did not facilitate acquisition or development of new assets. TRG determined
conversion to a REIT would facilitate access to capital and allow for future growth.
Capital Structure
Initial Public Offering
The IPO and conversion to a REIT, utilizing the UPREIT structure, provided an
opportunity for Taubman to repay outstanding loans. GM and AT&T were to receive
actual cash payments and any remaining debt (and the option to purchase 50% of TRG)
was to be converted to an equity interest in TCO and TRG. In addition, TRG could
utilize both partnership units and REIT common stock shares as "currencies" for future
acquisitions.
Though Taubman management states certain reasons for transition to the REIT
ownership structure, GM's desire to liquidate a portion of their investment and increase
liquidity on the remaining portion was a primary motivation for the IPO. A significant
amount of the proceeds went directly to satisfying part of GM's debt." 7
116 Taubman Centers, Inc., IPO Prospectus, November 20, 1992, p. 71.
117 Penobscot Group, Inc., "Real Estate Stock IPO Review," August 15, 1995, p. 5.
Following is a summary balance sheet as of December 31, 1994 (in 000's):
Real Estate Assets $668,602
Other Assets $71,209
Total Debt $872,158
Property Level Debt $258,836
Company Level Debt $613,322
Net Worth $101,693
Shares Outstanding 44,570,913
Source: Taubman Centers, Inc. 1994 Annual Report.
Capital Ratios:
Debt to Equity 72.1%
Property Debt to 56%
Equity
Current Ratio .34
Source: Taubman Centers, Inc. 1994 Annual Report.
Prior to its IPO TRG attained a credit rating to enhance its credibility as a truly
legitimate public company. Taubman's rating was recently downgraded from BBB+ to
BBB in May of this year."'
Portfolio Characteristics
TRG's holdings include 20 regional and super regional malls. The malls are located
in affluent trade areas with sixty six of the one hundred wealthiest zip codes within a 20
mile radius of a Taubman owned regional mall." 9 Gross leasable area of the portfolio is
22 million square feet with 9 million square feet of mall shop area.'2 0
Property Type Number of Assets Square Footage Mall Shop GLA
Regional Mall 20 22,031,000 9,088,000
The assets are located throughout the United States in; Arizona, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Tennessee, and
Virginia. The regional malls range from 1,900,000 square feet to 563,000 square feet.
The average size of a Taubman mall is 1,100,000 million square feet with 454,000 square
118 Salomon Brothers, "May 1995 Review," Salomon Brothers United States Real Estate Research, June
1995, p. 10.
119 Taubman Centers, Inc. 1994 Annual Report, p. 6.
20 Ibid., p. 20.
feet of mall shops. Seventy five percent of mall gross leasable area is leased to national
chains and ninety percent of income is generated by these tenancies.12 '
Ten of the malls are held in joint ventures. 2 2 TRG serves as the general partner of
the ten joint ventures. Ownership is a fifty percent interest in seven centers, and sixty
percent, seventy-nine percent, and twenty five percent in each of the three others.
Taubman, has a proactive management style and does not hesitate to retenant or
remerchandise to improve rents. They prefer to negotiate a tenant termination or buyout
for underperformers. If a tenant is doing well, Taubman will expand or move them to
accommodate mall and tenant needs. The result is an average portfolio lease term of six
to seven years. It is estimated that 8.5% of space, at any given time, is being managed in
this fashion resulting in a higher vacancy rate.12 3
Current projects include five mall redevelopments and one new development.
Redevelopments will add 601,000 square feet of mall space and a few anchors.
Taubman's first new development project, in seven years, was started in 1994 with an
expected completion in 1997. The Mall at Tuttle Crossing in Columbus, OH, will be
980,000 square feet and have four anchors. This project is being built in conjunction with
the Limited, a national clothing retailer, at a cost of $125 million. 2 4 Five more malls may
be developed by the turn of the century. 2 5
A value regional mall development of 2.5 million square feet is being planned. The
project is expected to cost $140 million and is TRG's first attempt at developing such a
mall.126 These malls combine off-price retailers (T. J. Maxx, Marshalls), manufacturers
outlets (Polo, Donna Karan), and retailer's outlets (Nordstrom's Rack). TRG feels this
area of retailing has synergy's with it's traditional business; center size, merchandising
mix, volume, diversity, and property location.12 7 Their decision to enter this new retailing
121 Taubman Centers, Inc., IPO Prospectus, November 20, 1992, p. 25.
122 Taubman Centers, Inc. 1994 Annual Report, p.20.
123 Cordell Lietz, Senior Vice President of Acquisitions, Taubman Companies, Interview, June 26, 1995.
124 Green Street Advisors, Inc., "Taubman Centers, Inc.," op. cit., p. 7.
125 Cordell Lietz, op. cit.
126 Green Street Advisors, Inc., "Taubman Centers, Inc.," op. cit., p. 7.
127 Ibid., p. 7.
area, though, has been negatively received by the market. Their share price has declined
and analysts are not in favor of this diversification strategy.
TCO's first asset acquisition, in December of 1994, was Biltmore Fashion Park in
Phoenix. It was acquired for $110 million, an approximate 8% capitalization rate based
on expected 1995 net operating income. The transaction involved $81.5 million in cash
and 1,540 partnership units, convertible to 3,000 shares of common stock. 128 The center is
zoned for expansion and represents an opportunity to enhance earnings with higher rental
rates and improved occupancy.129
Investment Strategy
TRG's strategy is to focus on high productivity, dominant regional malls with
strong customer franchise. Investment strategy includes acquiring existing malls,
expanding existing centers, development of new malls, and diversifying into value retail
specialty malls. Growth is also anticipated by increasing interests in TRG's joint
ventures. 130
In December of 1994 the Company's Board authorized repurchase of 500,000
shares of stock in the open market. As of February, 160,000 shares had been repurchased
at an average price of $9.50 per share."' A vote by management that it believes shares
are undervalued.
Performance
Green Street Advisors described TCO's performance as a public company as
"uninspiring". TRG failed to meet growth expectations in 1993 due to a miscalculation of
the expense of being a public company, primarily due to increased reporting requirements.
128 Taubman Centers, Inc., 1994 Annual Report, p. 39.
129 Marisa Timm, "Report Card Taubman Centers, Inc.," Information Profits, Inc., April 28, 1994, p.10 .
130 Taubman Centers, Inc. 1994 Annual Report, p. 3.
131 Ibid., p. 2.
Improved performance in 1994 was canceled when
of variable rate debt to rise.m
interest rate increases caused the cost
Source: Taubman Centers, Inc., 1994 Annual Report
Their two year total return as of December 31, 1994, was -1%. This return was
drastically below the NAREIT Equity Index return of 11% per year total return.133 Sales
per square foot increased by over 3% in 1993 and 1994 which was greater than Simon
(2%), DeBartolo (-1.2%), Rouse (-0.1%), and General Growth (1.6%). 134 Taubman has
been successful in capturing a greater portion of mall tenant occupancy costs than other
operators with an average of 14.8% in 1994, up from 14.6% in 1993. This success,
though, has not resulted in increased returns and cash flow growth from this aspect of
portfolio performance is unlikely.
TCO's inability to meet earnings expectations has caused their stock price to
decrease since their IPO and required yield to increase substantially. The following chart
exhibits this fact.
132 Green Street Advisors, Inc., Taubman Centers, Inc., op. cit., p. 3.
133 Ibid., p. 4.
114 Ibid., p.4.
Measure 1993 1994
Share Price 11 5/8 9 3/4
Capital Return 0% -16.13%
Income Return 7.57% 7.57%
Total Return 7.57% -8.56%
FFO $0.85 $0.89
FAD $0.87 $0.89
Dividends $0.88 $0.88
Dividends Payout as 103.5% 98.9%
a % of FFO
Occupancy 86.5% 86.6%
Sales per SF $325 $335
Occupancy Costs as 14.6% 14.8%
% of Sales per SF I
Stock Performance Since IPO
Date Price Dividend Yield
November 20, 1992 11 8%
May 31, 1995 95/8 9.1%
Source: Dean Witter's Equity REIT Monthly Statistical Review
SUMMARY
The descriptions of the four REITs portray the significant similarities between the
private and public regional mall REITs. They all own and compete for similar assets.
Operationally they provide the same services and cater to the same tenants. Their
investor bases are also comparable to some extent. The publics may have somewhat less
institutional representation, but their investment is still substantial.
On the following page a summary of each REIT's 1994 performance is provided.
JANUARY 1, 1994 TO DECEMBER 31, 1994
Comparatively the private regional malls REITs have significantly lower levels of
debt and increased financial flexibility than the public REITs. The cost of capital for the
public REITs is also higher. SPG's total return far exceeds the other REITs but these
returns, similarly to TCO, are at increased risk to shareholders because of high debt levels.
CPI has the highest occupancy level with 93%. CPI also has the most productive
malls with $341 sales per square foot. Though TCO has strong per square foot sales at
$335, it's inability to deliver on the growth expectations of the stock market have been
detrimental to its stock price and overall company value. This is evidenced by its -8.56%
total return for 1994, the worst for all of the REITs.
Measure CPI RPT SPG TCO
Market Capitalization $2,815,997 $678,104 $1,096,402 $434,556
# of Properties 33 15 119 20
# of Regional Malls 26 11 55 20
Regional Mall Assets 79% 73% 46% 100%
as % of Portfolio
Share Price $133.14 $17.67 24 1/4 93/4
Capital Return -0.78% -2.86% 7.2% -16.13%
Income Return 5.89% 5.28% 8.4% 7.57%
Total Return 5.11% 2.42% 15.58% -8.56%
FFO n/a $1.07 $2.09 $0.89
FAD $7.22 n/a n/a $0.89
Dividends $7.90 $0.96 $1.90 $0.88
Dividends Payout as a 107.5% 89.7% 90.9% 98.9%
% of FFO
Occupancy 93.3% 89.8% 86.2% 86.6%
Sales per SF $341 $285 $276 $335
Occupancy Costs as % 13% 8% 10.4% 14.8%
of Sales per SF
Weighted Average 6.5% 5.5% 7.8% 7.6%
Cost Of Capital
Total Liabilities to 23.9% 31% 66.5% 72.1%
Firm Value
Property Debt to Firm 20.6% 28.3% 59.2% 56%
Value I I I I _I
PERFORMANCE SUMMARY:
CHAPTER FIVE
COMPARISON OF PRIVATE MARKET VS. PUBLIC MARKET ASSET PRICING
During discussions with representatives of the studied REITs I have determined
asset pricing in the private and public markets is premised on the same analysis. Private
and public market REITs utilize the income approach for determining value of potential
acquisitions. Typically a cash flow is constructed and capitalized to determine current
value and additional assumptions are overlayed to determine investment value. Investment
value is a function of the potential a buyer foresees for enhancing a property's value
through management, expansion, remerchandising, or redevelopment.
This chapter will describe how the studied REITs evaluate acquisition
opportunities and the issues that constrain their valuations.
ACQUISITION ANALYSIS
All of the REITs studied in this thesis prepare diligent analysis of potential
acquisitions and see a majority of the same deals. Each REIT representative interviewed
stated that the finite supply of top-tier regional malls and the sale of a limited number each
year, typically only one or two, make it difficult to find product to acquire. Thus, the
market for these assets is extremely competitive. Following are a description of the most
important characteristics that are examined and the process by which a regional mall is
valued.
Investment Parameters
The valuation of a regional mall is dependent on its cash flow and the future
expectation for improving this cash flow. Anchor and satellite tenant health and stability,
trade area health, and future potential for expansion contribute to the quality of cash
flows.
A successful mall must have anchors that are the most successful in the
metropolitan or trade area.' These anchors serve to attract consumers that will also
frequent mall shops. Financial health of the anchors must be examined at the mall
location, as well as at the parent company level. Sales of other company stores in the area
will exhibit the anchors health comparatively to these locations. 13 6 This information may
indicate decisions the parent company will make if stores are to be expanded or closed.
The trade area for the mall should be substantial enough to support the desired
level of mall sales and preferably experiencing healthy growth. 3 7  Population and income
statistics for the trade area historically and the quality of housing being constructed
provide indications as to the continued viability of a mall over the investment holding
period.138
The opportunity to reposition, expand, or redevelop can enhance a mall's income
earning potential.13 9 Physical configuration of a mall and site that provide any of these
possibilities are attractive to the regional mall REITs. Expansion or development
opportunities at competing locations must also be factored into property valuations due to
possible implications these may have on future cash flow performance. Potential
development will provide an alternate location for an anchor store or competing store to
take market share. 4 0
Through discussions with industry professionals it became apparent how the
qualitative aspects of a regional mall ultimately affect cash flow. These factors must be
examined and anticipated to maximize value. Following is a discussion of how investors
quantitatively value cash flows.
135 Heitman Financial, Ltd., op. cit., p. V-1.
136 David M. Sherman, "Perception vs. Reality: Risks in Regional Mall Ownership," National Real Estate
Investor, Volume 35, Number 10, September 1993, p. 77.
13' Heitman Financial, Ltd., op. cit., p. V-1.
138 David M. Sherman, op. cit., p. 77.
139 Heitman Financial, Ltd., op. cit., p. V-1.
140 David M. Sherman, op. cit., p. 77.
Acquisition Valuation
After evaluation of qualitative factors the investor must determine the present cash
flow of the property and potential that exists to improve or enhance performance. Current
cash flow is determined by examining income and expense information for the property.
This amount is capitalized at an acceptable rate of return, to the investor, to establish a
current value. Investment value must then be discerned. Investment value is defined as;
"The specific value of an investment to a particular investor or class of
investors based on individual requirements; as distinguished from market
value, which is impersonal and detached."' 4 '
Investment value can be attributed to the opportunity for increasing property value
through management expertise, repositioning of the property, expansion, or
redevelopment.
Discounted cash flow (DCF) modeling is used to determine what cash flow
potential exists for the property upon acquisition. A DCF projects income and expense
over a specified time period, typically ten years. These forecasts are typically done on a
lease by lease basis, if the information is available, or prepared with information from lease
abstracts or a rent roll. Additional accuracy arises out of the ability to forecast new
leasing, capital expenditures, tenant improvements, and leasing commissions.14 2
A benefit to the DCF is the ability to use different discount rates to adjust for the
quality of tenant rental contributions. Anchor and national tenant income is usually
discounted at lower rates than regional and local tenant cash flow. This segregation of
income allows for a more accurate valuation of income.
A reversion capitalization rate must also be determined to capitalize cash flow in
the year after the holding period. The reversion value ascribes value to future cash flows.
This value is added to the cash flow of the last year of the holding term. Cash flow
estimates are then discounted at a discount rate, commensurate with the investors required
return, to arrive at a current value for the property.
141 Ibid., p. 159.
142 Ibid., p. 226.
Through discussions with industry professionals it became evident Internal Rate of
Return (IRR) analysis is another measure investors use to determine investment value.
IRR measures the rate of return on capital that is generated or capable of being generated
within an investment or portfolio over a period of ownership. 143 IRR is the discount rate
that equates the present value of future cash flows with the initial cash required to acquire
the property. This return is compared with the those generated by other investments and
the cost of capital. The goal is to determine the most profitable investment and whether
the cost of financing is compensated for by the property return.
Following are brief descriptions of each REIT's acquisition strategy and activity
level.
CPI Acquisitions
CPI's expansion activities have mitigated their need to acquire additional malls.
They examine all opportunities that arise but are not compelled to invest. When they do
acquire a mall their primary focus is going in yield and internal rate of return analysis.
Currently their required return is an 8% going in yield and a 12% IRR. Acquisitions must
be of a high caliber in order to attract retailers they have existing relationships with.14 4
General parameters that guide CPI investment decisions include;
e superior quality assets
e larger properties which are more efficient to manage and resistant to competition
e inflation hedging characteristics (percentage rent and pass-through of operating
expenses)
e opportunity to improve mall tenant mix
* opportunity to enhance performance and return with management expertise.145
CPI's last acquisition was Boca Town Center in Boca Raton, Florida. It has
average sales of $480 per square foot and was acquired from Urban Shopping Centers,
Inc., a public regional mall REIT.146
143 Ibid., p. 311.
144 Tom Zacharias, op. cit.
145 Corporate Property Investors 1994 Annual Report, p. 5.
146 Tom Zacharias, op. cit.
CPI had recently examined the Homart retail portfolio. Homart is the real estate
division of Sears, the retailer, that is presently liquidating office and retail portfolios. Only
a few of the properties in the portfolio were of interest to CPI. Therefore, it is more likely
they would attempt to purchase assets from the party that buys the portfolio.14 7
RPT Acquisitions
RPT acquires assets that are top quality with additional potential for value
enhancement. Investments are made utilizing a long-term strategy that allows for
realization of property appreciation. Focus during acquisition analysis is placed on
physical quality, purchase price versus replacement cost, current versus market rents, and
cash-on-cash returns. The ultimate goal is to eliminate short-term trends and assess
fundamental value.14 8
Bruce MacLeod, President of RPT, described the REIT as currently fully invested.
When acquisitions are made capital is sourced by contributions from current shareholders
or shares are sold without a commitment.
Acquisitions are analyzed for RPT by the O'Connor Group. Recently the Homart,
retail portfolio was reviewed and determined not to be of sufficient quality. Only six of
the twenty seven assets were of interest to RPT.
SPG Acquisitions
Simon Property Group's acquisition strategy is to purchase assets that are
accretive to cash flow and growing at least in pace with their current portfolio.14 9 Synergy
with their present property holdings is essential. Their analysis of acquisitions focus on
cash on cash yield and internal rate of return. Special attention is paid to capital
requirements that will arise over the next five to ten years."4
147 Bill Lyons, op. cit.
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In their first year as a public company one hundred deals were analyzed and only
four acquired. Recent acquisitions have not been in major urban areas. Competition for
properties in these urban areas, where other investors prefer to invest, make these malls
less attractive to SPG. The centers acquired have solid cash flows with significant
retenanting opportunities."'
During the fall of 1994 SPG had discussions with Equitable about purchasing a
portfolio of 19 regional malls. The Equitable deal was not completed and SPG acquired
only certain assets. The reason given by SPG for not acquiring the portfolio was the
removal of one asset, held in a joint venture with an institutional investor. The high
capitalization rate on this mall supposedly made the total capitalization rate for the
portfolio acceptable to SPG.'1 2
TCO Acquisitions
Taubman has experienced difficulty in finding quality malls. Their single property
focus on top-tier regional malls and the few assets that transact each year inhibit
Taubman's ability to find acquisition candidates. They look at malls that come on the
market, but will not purchase assets that negatively impact the value of their portfolio. 153
Analysis of acquisitions involves determining cash on cash yield. Property is
evaluated in its as is condition with TCO's income estimate. If tenants are rolling they
determine lease-up and income assumptions. 154
Since Taubman Realty Group became a publicly traded REIT, in 1992, they have
acquired greater interests in some joint venture assets. Their only property acquisition,
however, was Biltmore Fashion Park. A combination of cash and partnership units were
utilized in the purchase. One of the sellers preferred partnership units, so taxes could be
deferred, and the other partner preferred payment in cash.
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Private and public REITs utilize similar analytical processes to determine value.
All examine current cash flow and use discounted cash flows to determine cash flows that
can be expected in the future and the present value of these cash flows. IRR analysis is
also used to determine the viability of an investment. Therefore, at the property level
differences in asset valuation do not seem to exist.
Obviously, the investor with the lowest required rate of return and greatest interest
in acquiring an asset will pay the highest price. Factors that affect the decision to
purchase assets are investor expectations and the availability and cost of capital.
The expectations of investors direct management to follow a particular strategy.
Private REIT investors, typically pension funds, are long-term investors due to the nature
of their cash flow needs. For example, the investors in CPI and RPT are institutional
investors and use real estate as a diversification strategy.
The public REIT's also have institutional investors, but not to the extent of the
private REITs. Increased demands in the public REITs result from having to manage
shorter term, quarterly, assessments by Wall Street and the longer term nature of real
estate investment returns. The following statement, made by Cordell Lietz of Taubman in
reference to acquisitions, shows the unique situation the public REITs are faced with each
day:
"Discounted cash flows are less important for a public company. Analyst
have a three year time horizon, and DCF's have no credence. Our focus
is on cash on cash return. EBITDA and distributable cash flow are the
most important elements for us. Once the effect on earnings is discerned, a
total overall rate of return is determined. Taubman may buy on a low
initial return if an upside is seen, over a three to five year term the
acquisition must be accretive."155
Public REITs are reporting to two masters; the public market, where assets are repriced
every day and performance judged quarterly, and the real estate market, where investment
155 Cordell Lietz, op. cit.
and operating expertise can result in capital and income appreciation over a longer period
of time.
Investor expectations seem to be driving REITs to acquire assets or not. The
private REITs are not actively acquiring assets, though they do examine assets that are
made available for purchase. The public REITs are considerably more active, especially
SPG. The ability to buy from a spectrum of properties has made SPG able to transact in
areas the other REITs cannot. Taubman Centers is constrained by the fact that so few
top-tier regional malls are available for purchase and any acquisitions of a lesser quality
would be detrimental to their overall value.
Availability of capital also affects the ability of REITs to transact and the rate of
return a mall can be purchased for. The public REITs have utilized available capital for
redevelopment and acquisitions. Their leverage ratios, in the upper 50% range at year end
1994, are considerably higher than the private REITs. The debt levels of the publics,
which were reportedly not to exceed 50 percent when the REITs were initially offered, has
resulted in some REITs not being able to achieve growth expectations. The negative
impact on share price can also further diminish any possibility of debt or equity access.
The inability to raise capital due to a depressed stock price and high existing levels
of debt is affecting TCO. Their stock price has declined and their leverage, at 56%,
precludes them from accessing capital. Therefore, their ability to grow is constrained.
SPG in comparison has structured numerous joint venture relationships that do not
require initial cash investment, but contribution of services for eventual shares in the
properties developed. The result is the continuation of their growth through other
avenues and with other partners that believe in their capability to perform. SPG's
performance has also enabled them to access public equity as recently as this past April.
The cost of capital contributes to the ability of a REIT to purchase assets. The
private REITs have a lower weighted average cost of capital. RPT has the lowest at 5.5
percent and CPI at 6.5 percent. The public REITs are in the 7.6 to 7.8 percent range.
The higher cost of capital indicates the higher return, which is a function of the increased
risk of higher leverage levels, the public REITs must earn on their investments. This
increased cost makes it more difficult to purchase assets.
Simon, though, has been able to acquire more assets due to the greater range of
assets they have in their portfolio and their expertise in managing these assets. By not
being confined to only top-tier regional malls they have been able to access a less
competitive retail product market.
In the next chapter we will examine the differences in pricing at the REIT valuation
level and the implicit capitalization rate of each REIT to determine if pricing differences
exist between the private and public markets.
CHAPTER SIx
VALUATION OF REIT PORTFOLIOS IN THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC MARKETS
This chapter presents valuation methodologies for the private and public REITs
and the differences that are believed to exist in pricing. Private market valuation is based
on property economic value. Public market valuation considers both property value and
the impact of management and other factors on real estate performance. The Implicit
Capitalization Rate Model compares the four REITs to determine if public REITs are
credited with additional value. The appraisal methodology, public market valuation
models, differences said to exist between the two markets, and the Implicit Property
Capitalization Rate Model will be described.
PRIVATE MARKET PRICING
The private market focuses on the value of a property and utilizes the appraisal
process, which involves a detailed analysis of all elements of property value, to discern
market value. Portfolio value is the sum of each property's value. Many industry
professionals discredit the appraisal process for having a historical bias to past property
market performance and a subjective element because of the need to make assumptions to
predict future cash flows.
Regional Mall Appraisal Process
The appraisers duty is to determine market value by analyzing and evaluating
current market conditions. Appraisers gather information from buyers, sellers, lenders,
property managers, present tenants, prospective tenants, and retail consumers to
determine factors that affect the value of a property and the future expectation for
performance. 56 Market value is defined as:
The most probable price which a property should bring in a competitive
and open market under all conditions requisite to a fair sale, the buyer and
156 Vernor & Rabianski, op. cit., p. 162.
seller each acting prudently and knowledgeably, and assuming the price is
not affected by undue stimulus. 157
The complexity of regional malls requires that property rights, and possible modifications
or transfers of rights, be researched to establish a market value. Modifications of property
rights can be made by leases, easements, cross-easements, operating agreements, and
supplementary agreements. These documents are crucial to determining value because of
the implication other's rights can have on mall cash flow.
Three appraisal approaches are used in most property valuation; income, sales
comparison, and replacement cost. Only the income and sales comparison approaches are
applicable to regional malls. Issues that render the replacement cost approach less useful
for regional mall appraisal include; the absence of comparable substantial land sales make
land value difficult to estimate and the inability to assign value to the ongoing nature of
mall business operations.158 Estimates of property value arrived at by the income and
comparable sales approaches establish a range of value. The appraiser then determines a
realistic appraisal value for the specific property.
Income Approach:
The income approach is used when a property is purchased for investment. The
income stream is capitalized to determine value and this approach is most relevant to
regional mall appraisal:
The regional shopping center is almost always viewed by owners and
potential owners as an investment from which a certain minimum return
ought to be realized. Hence the income approach is the one with which the
appraiser should be most concerned. 159
Analysis of leases and property operating expenses should provide sufficient
information to determine property cash flows. Income is derived from minimum rents,
percentage rents, tenant expense recoveries, revenues from other services provided, and
miscellaneous income. Appraisers analyze lease terms and conditions to estimate revenues
157 Ibid., p. 159.
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per tenant, market rents, and concessions to determine financial expectations for space to
be leased in the future. Operating expense estimates are determined from property
operations or national estimates.
The first year of cash flow after projected acquisition, or the first year of stabilized
income, is capitalized to determine a property value. This is referred to as the direct
capitalization value. The capitalization rate used is a function of rates utilized in
comparable transactions that have occurred in the market. These other transactions must
be analyzed to determine that investors are using a similar decision-making process and
adjusted to the subject property's specific characteristics.160
A discounted cash flow (DCF), as previously described in chapter five, can also be
prepared for a specified time period to determine value. The DCF forecast is calculated at
the prevailing market return for regional malls.
Comparable Sales Approach
The comparable sales approach is relevant when there are a sufficient number of
transactions occurring in the market and sales information is readily available. The
objective is to utilize current transactions to estimate the value of the property being
appraised. This is done by determining what capitalization rates were utilized in other
transactions. Asset quality of each transaction must be considered and the capitalization
rate adjusted for differences between the properties. The trouble with utilizing the
comparable sales method for top-tier regional malls can be the absence of sufficient
transaction volume to determine a trend. 161
Private market valuation of a REIT portfolio is the sum of individual property
values established through periodic appraisals. Property performance, specifically cash
flow, is the fundamental element of portfolio value. In contrast public market REIT
valuation, which recognizes other factors that supposedly contribute to value, will be
examined in the next section..
160 Ibid., p. 235.
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PUBLIC MARKET PRICING
Pricing of real estate in the public equity market differs from private market
property valuation. In the public markets the value of management and other ancillary
services are incorporated into an entity value, often referred to as a going concern. This
going-concern value is defined as:
"...the value of a proven property operation; it is considered a separate
entity to be valued with an established business. This value is distinct from
the value of the real estate only. Going-concern value includes an intangible
enhancement of the value of an operating business enterprise which is
produced by the assemblage of the land, building, labor, equipment, and
marketing operation. This process leads to an economically viable business
that is expected to continue."16 2
Therefore, both quantitative (cash flow) and qualitative factors contribute to firm value.
Cash flow analysis in stock valuation is based on cash flow available for
shareholder dividends. REIT analysts spend a considerable amount of time analyzing the
capacity of a REIT to pay dividends to shareholders. A number of firms, specializing in
REIT analysis, have created various valuation models. Models that will be described
include those used by Green Street Advisors and Salomon Brothers. Both utilize similar
information and statistics to determine prices for public REITs.
The goal of these descriptions is to portray the quantitative and qualitative nature
of these analysis'. Value is quantified by certain measures and qualitative factors are
overlayed to determine ultimate share value. Also, the valuation models do not determine
REIT industry performance but the relative ranking of the public REITs within the same
property type.
Green Street Advisors Pricing Model
The Green Street Advisors (GSA) model evaluates both qualitative and
quantitative aspects of the REIT to arrive at total value. The model estimates current
value of the real estate and adds this to the remainder of the balance sheet to arrive at a
162 Ibid., p. 161.
current value for shareholders equity. The REIT is also graded on a number of factors
that are ranked in relation to peers in its property group. This is done to determine
whether the REIT shares should trade at a premium or discount to value in comparison to
competing firms.
Real estate net operating income is used to determine current property value. This
income number is calculated as earnings before interest and taxes (EBITDA) with general
and administrative expenses for the REIT added back, interest income subtracted, and
third party fee income subtracted. This calculation is done to isolate property income on
an unlevered basis. 163
The capitalization rate, used to calculate property value, is determined by a number
of factors. All of GSA's capitalization rate estimates are based on the ten year treasury
bond. This rate is adjusted to reflect cash flow growth expectations and the health of the
specific property type. Further modifications are made to reflect the expense of below or
above market debt, the value of property management or third party businesses, and
eliminate intangible assets (such as capitalized leasing commissions or financing costs). 164
The income estimate is capitalized at the above described rate to arrive at current
property value. This value is added to the remainder of the balance sheet to arrive at a
current value of shareholders equity.
Next the REIT is ranked on the following criteria to determine whether it should
trade at a premium or discount to value:
1. Franchise value; the ability of management to create additional
value through managing existing properties, acquisition, or
development.
2. Focus on property type and region.
3. Inside ownership by management.
4. Balance sheet strength, determined by examining total leverage,
variable rate debt, and debt maturity risk.
5. Overhead expenses for managing the REIT.
163 Green Street Advisors, Inc. Research, "REIT Pricing in a Bear? Market, An update of Our Pricing
Model," January 3, 1995, p. 6.
164 Ibid., p. 6.
6. Potential conflicts of interest. In the mall sector this includes the
disincentive of REIT management to sell assets upon which they
will incur a personal tax liability. 165
Each of these factors is ranked on a scale of one to five, except franchise value which is
ranked between one and ten. Each REIT receives a score based on these factors and is
ranked comparatively to other REITs of the same property type. Its ranking is perceived
as the REIT's current ability to add value for shareholders.166
Upon determination of the premium or discount at which the REIT should trade
at, it is applied to the current value estimate to determine a warranted share price. This
warranted share price is compared to the existing share price to determine whether the
REIT price is over or underpriced.167
The Green Street Advisors' model determines the property value and then overlays
adjustments for other attributes or detriments to REIT value. Next we will examine the
Salomon Brothers pricing model.
Salomon Brothers Regional Mall Pricing Model
The Salomon Brothers Model measures a company's value based on future
earnings and a relative ranking to its peers. The model does not predict changes for the
REIT industry as a whole, but rankings for the firms within the REIT industry. A
capitalization weighted multiple is determined and evaluates where each firm should be
relative to its peers.16
The pricing model starts with a company's cash available for distribution (CAD),
which is defined as funds from operations less recurring capital expenditures. Recurring
capital expenditures are those costs associated with new tenant space remodeling, other
tenant allowances, and physically maintaining a property on an ongoing basis (costs that
cannot be passed through to tenants). Income projections are made for each mall REIT,
1651bid, p.6.
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Mall Pricing Model," April 1994, p. 1.
CAD is determined, and a regional mall CAD multiple (a weighted average for the mall
sector) is calculated.16 9
Each company's CAD multiple is then adjusted. Both quantifiable and intangible
criteria are used which include:
1. Cash flow adjustment: based on the company's expected annual
growth in CAD over the next four years.
2. Debt level adjustment; debt to total capitalization ratio is
determined. Company's are penalized if CAD per share growth is
limited because of its debt level relative to its peers.
3. Interest rate adjustment; determined based on the four year average
annual impact of a 100 basis point move in interest rates on both
fixed, when it matures, and floating rate debt.
4. Private market real estate adjustment; focuses on isolating the
difference between the private market and public market
capitalization rates expressed as net operating income that is
necessary to bridge the gap between the two markets.
5. Inside ownership adjustment; compares management's ownership in
relation to its peers.
6. Internal growth adjustment; factors in the effect expiring leases at
lower than current market rental rates will have on cash flow.
7. Portfolio geographic location adjustment; based on the twelve
month trailing growth rate in general merchandise, apparel, furniture
and other stores (GAFO) sales. Attempt is to allow better
performing regions to benefit from higher sales growth and the
resulting effect on share price.
8. Intangible adjustment; qualitatively address conflicts of interest in
regard to businesses or real estate owned outside of REIT, franchise
value, quality of the income stream and track record.170
The CAD adjustment is determined by the rank each REIT achieves relative to its peers.
Each company's new CAD multiple is calculated by using the regional mall
average and adding or subtracting each company's total adjustment. The new multiple is
applied to estimates of distributable cash flow for the year and a target stock price is
determined. Total return is determined by the change in the stock price to reach the target
price and the current annualized dividend yield.' 7'
169 Ibid., p. 1.
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Both public REIT valuation models quantitatively and qualitatively attempt to
measure performance and growth expectations.
DIFFERENCES IN VALUATION BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC REGIONAL MALL
REITs
In the numerous sources of information that have been researched and interviews
conducted for this thesis the prevalent opinion of many public market proponents was
public REITs should command a premium to underlying asset value. The supposed
benefits to the public REIT vehicle are attributed to the value of management, services the
REIT provides, and improved liquidity. Investors are supposedly willing to pay a
premium for these attributes. The only detriment to value considered is conflict of interest
in valuation of public regional mall REITs. The disincentive for management to sell
properties that might trigger tax liabilities is the underlying issue. After evaluation of all
factors, REIT shares should trade at a premium to underlying property value for growth
potential or a discount for perceived risk.172
Other factors considered in the public models have been ignored in this analysis.
These factors include debt levels and the cost of this debt. The comparison of the REITs
on an unlevered basis precludes these factors from affecting results.
Pricing differences between the private and public markets should exist if investors
truly value management, improved liquidity, and the third party service company
component of the public REIT more so than the detrimental effect of management's
conflict of interest. The existence of a premium seems logical due to the different
methodologies utilized by the private and public REITs to value portfolios. Public REITs
should, therefore, trade at higher values than private REITs. The result should be higher
property value and lower capitalization rates for public REITs.
172 Mueller, Pauley, and Morrill, op. cit., p. 19.
Management's Value
Going concern value of the public REITs attributes value to the operating business
of the REIT and its viability to continue successful operations. What drives going concern
value is management's ability to enhance performance. The long operating history of
many of the regional mall companies and the continued involvement of founding principals
were marketed as attributes to public regional mall REIT investment at the time of their
IPO's.
Liquidity
Liquidity in real estate investments is improved through investment in public
REITs for some investors. The ease of transacting in the public markets is attractive to
many investors compared to the time required to sell a wholly owned asset, which can be
six months to a year at a minimum for larger assets. Therefore, liquidation of shares
should be more efficient in the public markets.
Issues can arise, though, when a large position is owned in a single REIT and
liquidation of shares will cause price changes in the stock. An orderly liquidation of the
position might not affect the share price but can take a significant amount of time to
execute depending on the trading volume of REIT shares and interest by other investors.
To some extent all of the regional mall REITs, both private and public, have
similar investor bases. The speed of the transaction may be slower in the private market
because a party may need to be found to buy shares. Ultimately, though, shares will
transact in either market if they are priced attractively to investors.
Third Party Services
Value of third party management and development services, though not examined
in this thesis, do benefit the public REITs by the proportionate cash flow provided from
these activities. SPG is a REIT that derives a substantial amount of income, $44 million in
1994, from services provided to third parties.
Conflicts of Interest
The public regional mall REITs benefited by using the UPREIT format to convert
their firms to public companies and in the process deferred tax liabilities. The existence of
these liabilities creates a conflict of interest between management's desire to continue to
defer the payment of taxes and operating in the best interest of shareholders. This is a
factor that should be detrimental to the value of public REIT shares.
Differences said to exist between private and public valuation at the REIT level
should ultimately affect total REIT property value. Private market REIT valuations do
not take management's expertise into consideration, whereas the public markets do.
Improved liquidity in the public markets is another reason public REITs should trade at a
premium to value. Value added by third party services should add value to REIT share
prices, but this factor was not studied in this thesis. The only detrimental factor in the
public market valuation is the conflict of interest for deferred tax liabilities. Therefore,
public REITs should command a premium to underlying property value in comparison to
private REITs if benefits outweigh the conflicts of interest.
In the next section Implicit Capitalization Rates are computed for each of the
REITs to discern what valuation differences do exist between the private and public
markets.
IMPLICIT CAPITALIZATION RATE MODEL
METHODOLOGY
The model was designed to determine the implicit capitalization rate for a REIT.
The capitalization rate is the total current unlevered property return for the REIT. Only
income derived from property operations, so as not to have any of the firm's other assets
adding value unassociated with specific property performance, was used in the calculation.
Excluded income included interest income and fees from management or development
services. Other income sources are more prevalent in the public REITs, particularly SPG.
The capitalization rate was derived from dividing income of each REIT by the
implied property value of the REIT, allowing for comparison of property value between
the public and private REITs. Calculations for each REIT can be found in Appendix B.
Implied Property Value
As stated earlier, the implied property value is determined for real property assets.
Value for other income has been excluded to the extent that information from annual
reports or REIT interviews was provided. The calculation combines value of shareholder
equity, an adjustment for excluded income, and the net liabilities of the firm.
Equity value for the public REITs was computed by multiplying the number of
outstanding shares by the price of the REIT stock on the date of evaluation. Private equity
value was determined by using the year end appraisal value per share times the value of
the share. December 31, 1994, was selected to allow for comparison.
All of the REITs required adjustment for non-property revenue excluded from
each's income calculation. The value of each REIT was reduced, or proportion of the
REIT's share of the operating partnership, to correct for assets not credited with income
producing capability. The amount of this adjustment reduced implied property value.
Therefore, the net result reduces the implied property value of each REIT.
Net liabilities were computed using the total liabilities of the firm and subtracting
the assets of the firm. Real property assets were excluded and adjustments made to
exclude non-cash items. The resulting effect of the net liabilities computation offsets
liabilities with assets that are valued at 100%. If the REIT owns only a portion of the
Operating Partnership, as is the case with SPG and TCO, net liabilities were calculated as
the percent ownership to which each is entitled.
The equity value, adjustment for excluded property revenues, and net liabilities are
combined to arrive at an implied property value for the firm. This serves as the
denominator for determining the capitalization rate of the properties.
EBITDA
In place of net operating income, I have used earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). As discussed earlier, net operating income is
not a true measure of real estates income producing capability. EBITDA allows for a
comparison of all of the REITs on an unlevered basis, whereby individual REIT debt levels
will not effect the results. EBITDA was calculated by reconstructing income and expense
items (from each REITs annual report) that are relevant to mall operations. Income used
in the calculation was from property operations, other income was excluded for all of the
REITs.
Modifications were made to improve the consistency of each REIT's financial
information. The primary challenge in evaluating cash flow involves determining how
certain items are accounted for by the REITs. Issues arise in regard to how each accounts
for capital expenditure allowances, straight line rents, land sales, and tenant
inducements. 173
Capital expenditure allowances are reflected for the public REITs, who are
considered to be more aggressive in their reporting of FFO by industry analysts. This
number has been estimated as the average of Wall Street analyst opinions. Straight line
rents result from the use of average rents to calculate revenues. An adjustment is made in
the cash flow statement to offset funds not received. Proceeds from land sales were not
used in the calculation because of their extraordinary nature and the lack of applicability to
the revenues derived from the portfolio of regional malls. Tenant inducements could not
be discerned for all of the REITs from the information provided so no adjustments were
made.
173 NAREIT Memorandum, op. cit.
ADJUSTMENTS
Corporate Property Investors
An adjustment to firm value was made to offset the exclusion of income not
derived from property operations.
Retail Property Trust
Income and expense modifications were made to include depreciation and
amortization from joint venture interests, a minority interest in FFO, to exclude straight-
line rents, and capitalized interest expense for development projects. Firm value
adjustments were required to offset the exclusion of income not derived from property
operations.
Simon Property Group
Adjustments were made to include depreciation and amortization from joint
venture interests and the REIT's share of the same for the management company. Also,
joint venture interest expense was included. Reductions were made to EBITDA to
allocate non-revenue generating capital expenditures and to compensate for straight line
rents included in income.
A firm value adjustment was required to counteract the exclusion of non-property
income. The REIT realizes its pro-rata share of these adjustments to the operating
partnership.
Taubman Centers
The REITs share of joint venture depreciation and amortization and interest
expense were added back. Deductions from EBITDA were made for non-revenue
generating capital and for gains recognized on land sales.
An adjustment to firm value was made to account for the exclusion of non-
property income. The REIT realizes its pro-rata share of these adjustments to the
operating partnership.
Adjusted EBITDA was then divided by the implied property value to arrive at the
capitalization rate estimates.
FFO MULTIPLES
FFO multiples were also computed for each REIT. Share price was divided by
FFO to arrive at the multiple. This was done in an attempt to determine and compare
growth expectations of investors in each REIT.
RECONCILIATION OF FFO
Finally, a reconciliation of FFO was also computed for each REIT. The FFO
estimate determined by the model was increased to reflect income the REITs were not
credited with in the EBITDA calculation. These results were compared to each REIT's
FFO estimate.
IMPLIED PROPERTY CAPITALIZATION RATES
as of December 31, 1994
REIT CPI RPT SPG TCO
Implied Market $3,088,051 $608,410 $1,969,167 $779,090
Value of REIT
Properties
EBITDA for REIT $221,004 $48,675 $156,065 $59,231
Portfolio
Implied 7.2% 8.0% 7.9% 7.6%
Capitalization Rate
FFO Multiple 17.3 19.1 16.8 13.1
Results
The comparable implied capitalization rates, current return derived from property
operations, are relatively consistent for each REIT. The differences in the capitalization
rates can be explained by specific mall quality and unique attributes of each REIT's
portfolio. Regional malls trade in the seven to eight percent range and all of the REITs
fall in this range.
CPI has the highest sales per square foot average at $341 and the highest
occupancy of the REITs at 93.3%. Therefore, the 7.2% capitalization rate seems to be
appropriate. The FFO multiple of 17.3 is higher than the public REITs and indicates
growth is an important element for investors in CPI.
TCO sales per square foot average $335, but occupancy is only 86.6%. Though
they have an excellent portfolio of top-tier malls, their higher vacancy does effect property
performance and ultimately asset value. Their lower FFO multiple, of 13.1, shows TCO is
not credited with as substantial a growth story as the other REITs studied.
SPG has fifty-five regional malls in its portfolio. These properties produce 76% of
portfolio revenue. Therefore, their 7.93% capitalization rate, higher than the top two
regional mall REITs, seems warranted. The influence of shopping centers and the higher
rates they trade at are affecting the overall capitalization rate. Their FFO multiple of 16.8
indicates investors believe their growth story and have expectation for future benefits to
come from management's activities.
RPT has eleven regional malls in its portfolio of fifteen assets. The greater
proportion of shopping centers in the portfolio could partially explain their higher
capitalization rate of 8%. The smaller market capitalization of the REIT and greater
proportion of redevelopment in the portfolio, expected to impact cash flows in 1996 and
beyond, should result in RPT's capitalization rate decreasing as cash flow improvements
are realized. The FFO multiple of 19.1 seems to further support the expectation of
investors that future cash flows will improve as a result of property improvements.
The reconciliation of FFO resulted in differences in the range of one to seven
percent. CPI's difference was one percent, SPG and TCO were both four percent, and
RPT's was seven percent. These variations are likely an effect of activities in
unconsolidated joint ventures. Differences could result from allocation of income or
depreciation and amortization that were not discernible from information in the annual
reports. Calculations are provided in Appendix B.
This chapter has examined the process of REIT valuation in both the private and
public markets. The implicit capitalization model proves differences in pricing are minor
at the portfolio property level. Differences between the REIT capitalization rates can be
explained by asset quality differentials and portfolio factors, such as occupancy or ongoing
improvements, that affect cash flow.
In Chapter Seven a comparison of pricing differences will be examined and
conclusions for the thesis presented.
CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSIONS
To discern the difference in pricing between the private and public regional mall
REITs a number of industry professionals were interviewed. I had an opportunity to
speak with both private and public REITs, a number of private real estate advisors and
investors, and REIT analysts. My objectives were to ascertain what criteria are used to
determine investment strategy, how acquisitions are analyzed, and differences in valuation
of REIT portfolios in the private and public markets.
These discussions and research have led me to conclude that pricing between the
private and public regional mall REITs is efficient, or at least more efficient than the
opinions of many public REIT proponents imply. Analysis of acquisitions is done with the
same methodology in both the private and public markets; focus is on current return and
discounted cash flows are prepared to project current and future performance.
Differences in valuation are said to exist at the REIT level. The factors proclaimed to add
value in the public markets are management's expertise, improved liquidity in the public
markets, and services provided by the REIT. Potential conflicts of interest, in relation to
deferred tax liabilities, was the only factor proclaimed as detrimental to value. These
differences, assuming investors value the three positive attributes more so than the one
negative, should logically result in a premium to underlying property value for public
REITs in comparison to private REITs. The calculation of implicit capitalization rates for
each REIT refutes the existence of a premium for public REIT value.
The reason for the supposed value of these factors resulted from Wall Street's
desire to participate in the resolution of the real estate capital crisis. Lack of capital in the
private markets made the public markets the only option for many real estate operating
companies to recapitalize debt. Private market providers of funds were few and far
between as property owners required funds to refinance. The low interest rate
environment and the yields achievable on real estate provided the impetus for the public
markets to eagerly fill the void left by private market sources.
Wall Street was able to re-create these real estate portfolios and sell them at a
premium by "creating value" with the caveat that seasoned management's expertise,
improved liquidity, and third party services would provide benefits unavailable in private
real estate investment. These intangible assets were used to make the pricing work for
some firms.
REITs were marketed as growth companies at a time when abundant opportunities
existed to create value. Growth was anticipated to result from general improvement in the
economy, with expected increases in real estate demand and rental rates, and acquisition
and development of new product.
The "growth stories" sold were achievable in that particular interest rate
environment. REITs were able to repay debt with IPO proceeds and rejuvenate debt
financing at lower interest rates. Additional funds were borrowed to acquire assets, which
at that time were attractively priced due to the real estate recession, and achieve return
goals through positive spread investing. As the economy improved and opportunities to
buy assets at a discount evaporated, public REITs have found growth more difficult to
achieve. The result has been price corrections in the share price of firms unable to meet
investor expectations.
Improved liquidity is the only factor that I would ascribe value to for public REIT
share ownership for the average investor. True liquidity, though, is not as evident for
investors with large stakes in a particular REIT. Sale of a large REIT share position can
cause drastic changes in price. Thus, a liquidation strategy that requires a longer period of
time to implement might be prudent for such an investor.
The participation of a number of institutional investors in both the private REITs
and as a money source for the original regional mall operating companies makes this
liquidity issue less significant in this sector of REITs. Many investors are less concerned
with liquidity due to the nature of their cash flow needs and are comfortable with real
estate investment.
One obvious exception was GM's desire for Taubman to convert to a REIT in
1992. The IPO provided GM cash proceeds and a better exit strategy for their remaining
investment, by conversion to operating partnership units and REIT shares. This decision
could have been prompted by their recognition of the few growth opportunities Taubman
would be able to take advantage of, due to their focused strategy.
The offering of third party services by the public REITs does add some value but
was not examined in this thesis. Logically, the cash flow these services produce would
effect overall REIT value. Also, the greater risk of these cash flows (from contracts which
are often subject to thirty day cancellation clauses) would temper their reliability and
recognition at full value.
The results of the Implied Capitalization Rate Model indicate property is priced
consistently in both the private and public markets. The range of capitalization rates was
between 7.2 percent and eight percent. Once adjusted for quality and performance
differentials are relatively comparable.
Investors in private and public REITs value investments for the cash flow they are
able to produce. There is no value attributed for the supposed value of management and
other "qualities' of the public regional mall REITs. The public market is not attributing
value at the REIT property level.
The model proves that the markets are efficient. The value of management and its
ability to improve property performance is reflected in an enhanced property cash flow and
the resulting asset valuation.
APPENDIX A
REIT Interviews
The REIT professionals who generously contributed information, perspectives, time, and
guidance were of great assistance. Their time, efforts, and accessibility were appreciated.
Following are the primary contacts at the REITs that were studied.
Bill Lyons
Tom Zacharias
Bruce MacLeod
Steve Sterrett
Cordell Leitz
Corporate Property Investors
Corporate Property Investors
Retail Property Trust
Simon Property Group
Taubman Companies
Industry Professionals
Many thanks to the numerous industry professionals who generously provided invaluable
information and guidance as I learned and researched my thesis topic.
Charlie Beaver
David Carter
Barry Curtis
Jeff Fisher
Jon Foshiem
Tom Johnson
Jeff Johnston
John Konarski
Peter Korpacz
George McCanse
Sarah Postyn
Michael Tubridy
Floris vanDyijkum
Jay Willoughby
Equitable Real Estate
Winthrop Associates
Alex, Brown & Sons
Director, Center for Real Estate Studies, Indiana University
Green Street Advisors, Inc.
L.W. Elwood
Telerus
International Council of Shopping Centers
Peter F. Korpacz & Associates
Trahan Partners
Yarmouth Group
International Council of Shopping Centers
Salomon Brothers
Aldrich, Eastman & Waltch
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Financial Model Background Information
I. Implicit Capitalization Rate Model.
II. EBITDA & FFO Calculations.
III. FFO Reconciliation.
IV. REIT Balance Sheets and Income Statements.
I. Implicit Capitalization Rate Model
Implied Capitalization Rate Comparison
As of December 31, 1994
# Shares Outstanding
Stock Price 12/31/94
Market Value of Common Equity/Appr Value
Total Value of Equity
Less:
Adjustment Due to Excluded Non-Property
Revenue(Calculated as % interest in REIT)
Add:
Total Liabilities
Less:
Cash & Cash Equivalents
Tenant Receivables & accrued revenue, net
Notes Rec & advances due from Mgmt Co.
Other assets
Minority Interests
Short-term Investments
Construction in progress & pre-construction
Land held for development
Properties subject to net lease & other
Marketable Securities
Investments in real estate JVs
Total
Net Liabilities
% Interest of Net Liabilities
Total Interest of Net Liabilities
Implied Market Value of Properties
EBITDA for Portfolio
% Interest of EBITDA
Total Interest EBITDA
CPI
21,157
133.10
2,815,997
2,815,997
RPT
38,376
17.67
678,104
678,104
SPG
45,212
24 1/4
1,096,402
1,096,402
TCO
44,571
9 3/4
434,566
434,566
88,820 25,030 149,934 24,570
886,066 304,910 2,175,535 1,122,759
56,420
108,998
263,902
60,683
7,827
27,362
525,192
360,874
100.0%
360,874
3,088,051
221,004
100.0%
221,004
2,457
7,645
1,932
12,611
40,619
3,029
281,281
349,574
(44,664)
100.0%
(44,664)
608,410
48,675
100.0%
48,675
105,139
146,555
75,405
27,174
7,966
362,239
1,813,296
56.4%
1,022,699
1,969,167
276,712
56.4%
156,065
10,709
9,927
5,582
44,991
71,209
1,051,550
35.1%
369,094
779,090
168,748
35.1%
59,231
7.93% 7.60%7.16% 8.00%Implied Cap Rate
II. EBITDA & FFO Calculations
Corporate Property Investors
EBITDA Calculation:
1994
Income
Rentals & related property income
Total Income
Expense
Real Estate Taxes
Salaries & Related Benefits
Repairs & Maintenance
Utilities
Other
Admin, Trustee, & Other Expenses
EBITDA
FFO Calculation:
EBITDA
Less:
Interest Expense
Mortgage Interest
FFO
# Shares outstanding
FFO per share
P/E Ratio
Adjustment Due to Excluded Non-Property Revenues
403,871
403,871
(56,892)
(35,953)
(30,594)
(26,479)
(24,741)
(8,208)
(182,867)
221,004
221,004
51,388
7,033
62,583
21,157
7.68
17.3
Amount Term Discount Rate Present Value
Dividends and Interest
Income from Net Leased Properties
5,894 Perpetuity
2,988 Perpetuity
10% 58,940
10% 29,880
88,820Total Adjustment
Assumptions:
1. Interest income was calculated as a perpetutity.
2. Net leased properties are assumed to be a continuing source of revenue.
Retail Property Trust
EBITDA Calculation:
1994
Rental Income 70,659
Operating Costs:
Operating Expenses 22,115
Real estate taxes 6,939
Property & portfolio management fees 5,613
General & Administrative expenses 1,497
Adjusted Operating Costs 36,164
Income before equity in earnings of JVs 34,495
Equity in earnings of real estate JVs 9,660
EBITDA 44,155
Add back:
JV depreciation & amortization* 6,181
Minority interest in FFO 56
Less:
Straight-line rent adjustments 1,717
Adjusted EBITDA 48,675
* Footnote: Portion of JV depreciation and amortization addback was calculated as 44.6%.
This percentage was determined by dividing the REITs equity in earnings of JVs by total
JV earnings.
Retail Property Trust
FFO Calculation:
EBITDA
Less:
Interest Expense
FFO
# Shares outstanding
FFO per share
P/E Ratio
Adjustment Due to Excluded Non-Property Revenues
Dividends and Interest Income
Total Adjustment
Assumptions:
1. Interest income was calculated as a perpetutity.
Amount
2,503
Term Discount Rate Present Value
Perpetuity 10% 25,030
25,030
48,675
(13,214)
35,461
38,376
0.92
19.1
Simon Property Group
EBITDA Calculation:
1994
Revenues:
Minimum Rent 240,559
Overage Rent 25,463
Tenant Reimbursements 162,706
Total Revenue 428,728
Operating Expenses:
Property Operating 91,792
Real Estate Taxes 44,403
Repairs & maintenance 23,430
Advertising & promotion 12,633
Provision for credit losses 4,238
Other 6,937
Adjusted Operating Expenses 183,433
Operating Income 245,295
Less:
Minority Interest 3,759
Limited Partners interest in the operating partnership 18,951
Income(loss) from unconsolidated entities:
Partnerships & JV's 1,034
Management Company (1,101)
(67)
Add back:
REIT's share of Mgmt Co depreciation & amortization** 634
JV Interest expense 38,124
JV Depreciation & amortization 26,409
Total add back 65,167
EBITDA 287,819
Adjustments:
Non-revenue generating capital expenditures 6,782 ($.15 per share)
Straight-line rent adjustment 4,326
Total adjustments 11,108
Adjusted EBITDA 276,712
* Footnote: Other income less $9,100 in dividend income in 1994, none in 1993.
**Footnote: Computed as 56.4% interest in Operating Partnership's interest of 80% of $1,406
for 1994 and 52.2% interest of 80% of $1,774. (SPG 1994 Annual Report, p. 43.)
Simon Property Group
FFO Calculation: 1994
Adjusted EBITDA 276,712
Less:
Interest Expense 122,980
JV Interest Expense 38,124
Total Interest Expense 161,104
FFO 115,608
SPG % of FFO 56.4%
SPG FFO 65,203
# Shares outstanding 45,212
FFO per share 1.44
P/E Ratio 16.8
Adjustment Due to Excluded Non-Property Revenues
Amount Term Discount Rate Present Value
Management Company Dividends and Interest 10,000 5 20% 29,906
Temporary Tenants 18,000 Perpetuity 10% 180,000
Corporate Interest Income 3,500 Perpetuity 10% 35,000
Land Sales 4,000 5 20% 11,962
Lease Settlements 3,000 5 20% 8,972
Total Adjustment 265,840
Assumptions:
1. Management dividends and interest were calculated per REIT analyst industry standard. Calculated in this
manner due to the possibility of cancellation of management contracts that have 30 day cancellation clauses.
2. Temporary tenants, carts and kiosks in mall area, is assumed to be a continuing source of revenue.
3. Corporate interest income was explained to be higher than usual due to large cash balances. 50% of the
$7 million total was used as a base amount.
4. Land sales are estimated to continue for five years and are discounted at 20%.
5. Lease settlements presently average $3 million per year. Due to the real estate problems of the last few
years and the likelihood this amount decreases when the economy is strong, this figure has been projected
for five years and discounted at 20%. (Similar to REIT analysts calculation of other less stable cash flows.)
Taubman Centers, Inc.
EBITDA Calculation:
1994
Revenues:
Minimum Rent 111,373
Percentage Rent 3,788
Recoveries from tenants 68,075
Adjusted Revenues 183,236
Operating Costs:
Recoverable from tenants 58,355
Other operating 20,974
Management, leasing & development services 3,538
General & administrative 17,942
Adjusted Operating Costs 100,809
Adjusted Operating Income 82,427
Add:
Equity in income before extraordinary items 51,263
of unconsolidated JV's
Total Income 133,690
Add back JV Interests:
Interest expense 26,590
Depreciation & amortization 12,479
Total JV Interests add backs 39,069
EBITDA 172,759
Adjustments:
Non-revenue generating capital expenditures 3,120 ($.07 per share)
Gain on land sales 891
Total Adjustments 4,011
Adjusted EBITDA 168,748
Taubman Centers, Inc.
FFO Calculation:
1994
Adjusted EBITDA 168,748
Less:
Interest Expense 47,732
JV Interest Expense 26,590
Total Interest 74,322
FFO 94,426
TCO % of FFO 35.1%
TCO FFO 33,144
FFO per share 0.74
P/E Ratio 13.1
Adjustment Due to Excluded Non-Property Revenues
Estimated as information was said to be proprietary.
Amount Term Discount Rate Present Value
Estimate of Other Income 7,000 Perpetuity 10% 70,000
Adjustment 70,000
Assumptions:
1. Estimated as 50% of $14 million total.
Included in this amount are tenant settlements, garage revenues, land sales, interest income,
trash removal, and merchant asssociation fees.
Source: Cordell Leitz, Taubman Companies, Inc.
III. FFO Reconciliation
Reconciliation of Funds From Operations
Corporate Property Investors
Income From Net Leased Properties 2,988
Interest Income 5,894
Total 8,882
Impact on FFO per share $0.42
Reconciled FFO per share $8.10
Difference from Company Estimate No estimate given in annual report
Note: CPI states that distributable funds would be $.63 greater if not adjusted for tenant
inducements. When CPI's distributable funds estimate of $7.22 is combined with this
$.63, the total is $7.98. An additional $.03 adjustment must be made to include CRC's
distribution which is not accounted for in CPI's financial statements but added to
the distribution to shareholders. The net difference is $.09 per share.
Retail Property Trust
Dividend and Interest Income 2,503
Total 2,503
Impact on FFO per share $0.07
Reconciled FF0 per share $0.99
Difference from Company Estimate $0.08
Reconciliation of Funds From Operations
Simon Property Group
Other Income 44,948
Total 44,948
% Interest 56.4%
SPG Interest in Other Income 25,351
Impact on FFO per share $0.56
Reconciled FFO per share $2.00
Difference from Company Estimate $0.09
Taubman Centers, Inc.
Other Income 8,981
Related Party Revenues 4,917
Total 13,898
% Interest 35.1%
TCO Interest in Other Income 4,878
Impact on FFO per share $0.11
Reconciled FFO per share $0.85
Difference from Company Estimate $0.04
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IV. REIT Balance Sheets and Income Statements
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Corporate Property Investors
Financial Statements as of December 31, 1994
Balance Sheet
1994
Assets:
Real Estate Investments:
Operating Properties 1,571,756
Construction in Progress 60,683
Land held for development 7,827
Properties subject to net lease and other 27,362
Reserve for possible investment loss (12,400)
1,655,228
Cash and cash equivalents 56,420
Short-term investments 263,902
Receivables and other assets 108,998
Total Assets 2,084,548
Liabilities & Shareholders Equity:
Mortgages Payable 69,580
Notes & Bonds Payable 693,951
Accounts payable and other liabilities 122,535
Total liabilities 886,066
Shareholders equity 1,198,482
2,084,548
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Corporate Property Investors
Statement of Income
1994
Income from operating properties:
Rentals and related property income 403,871
Expenses:
Real Estate Taxes (56,892)
Mortgage Interest (7,033)
Salaries and related benefits (35,953)
Repairs & Maintenance (30,594)
Utilities (26,479)
Other (24,741)
Amortization of dept store and tenant indcmts (13,265)
Depreciation (57,006)
(251,963)
151,908
Income from net leased properties and other 2,988
Interest income 5,894
Interest expense (51,388)
Administrative, trustee and others expenses (8,208)
Income before non-recurring & extraord items 101,194
Non-recurring gain on sales of properties 36,118
Income before extraordinary items 137,312
Extraordinary loss from prepayment and refi (88)
mortgage debt
Net Income 137,224
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Retail Property Trust
Financial Statements as of December 31, 1994
Balance Sheet
1994
Assets:
Operating Properties 729,021
Less accumulated depr & amort 77,373
651,648
Investments in RE JV's 281,281
Mortgage notes receivable 1,932
Tenant and other receivables 7,645
Cash and cash equivalents 2,457
Short-term investments 40,619
Marketable securities 3,029
Other assets 12,611
Total Assets 1,001,222
Liabilities & Shareholders Equity:
Bonds payable, net of discount 149,343
Construction loan payable 87,500
Mortgage notes payable 41,000
Accounts payable 17,857
Dividend payable 9,210
Total liabilities 304,910
Minority interest 8,670
Commitments and contingencies
Shareholders Equity:
Common shares of beneficial interest 809,323
Accumulated deficit (121,555)
Unrealized loss on marketable securities (126)
Total Shareholders Equity 687,642
Total Liabilities & Shareholders Equity 1,001,222
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Retail Property Trust
Statement of Operations
1994
Revenues:
Rental Income 70,659
Interest and dividend income 2,503
73,162
Operating Costs:
Operating expenses 22,115
Real Estate Taxes 6,939
Property & portfolio mgmt fees 5,613
General & Admin expenses 1,497
Loss from reduction in carrying amount -
of properties sold or to be sold
36,164
Operating Income before equity in JV's 36,998
Equity in earnings of RE JVs 9,660
Operating income before int exp, depr,
amort, & minority interest 46,658
Interest Expense (13,214)
Depreciation & Amortization (23,003)
Minority Interest (56)
Net Income 10,385
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Simon Property Group
Financial Statements as of December 31, 1994
Balance Sheet
1994
Assets:
Operating Properties 1,900,027
Less accumulated depr & amort 70,916
1,829,111
Cash & cash equivalents 105,139
Tenant receivables and accr rev 146,555
Notes rec & advances due from Mgmt Co. 75,405
Deferred costs, net 85,878
Other assets 27,174
Minority interest 7,966
Total Assets 2,277,228
Liabilities & Shareholders Equity:
Mortgages & other notes payable 1,938,091
Accounts payable & accrued expenses 102,750
Accrued distributions 40,807
Cash distributions & losses in excess of net
investment in partnrshps & JV's, at equity 57,064
Investment in Mgmt Co 16,875
Other Liabilities 19,948
Total Liabilities 2,175,535
Commitments and contingencies
Limited Partners Interest in Oper Prtnrshp 44,386
Shareholders Equity:
Common stock 5
Class B common stock 1
Capital in excess of par value 135,565
Accumulated deficit (78,264)
Total Shareholders Equity 57,307
Total Liabilities & Shareholders Equity 2,277,228
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Simon Property Group
Statement of Operations
1994
Revenues:
Minimum rent 240,559
Overage rent 25,463
Tenant reimbursements 162,706
Other income 44,948
Total revenue 473,676
Expenses:
Property operating 91,792
Depreciation & amortization 75,945
Real estate taxes 44,403
Repairs & maintenance 23,430
Advertising & promotion 12,633
Provision for credit losses 4,238
Other 6,937
Total operating expenses 259,378
Operating income 214,298
Interest expense 122,980
Non-recurring interest expense 27,184
Income (loss) before minority interest 64,134
Minority interest (3,759)
Income (loss) before unconsolidated entities 60,375
Income (loss) from unconsolidated entities:
Partnerships & JVs 1,034
Management Company (1,101)
(67)
Income (loss) of the operating partnership
before extraordinary items 60,308
Extraordinary items (17,980)
Income (loss) of the operating partnership 42,328
Less limited partners interest in the operating
partnership 18,951
Net Income (loss) 23,377
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Taubman Centers, Inc.
Financial Statements as of December 31, 1994
Balance Sheet 1994
Assets:
Properties 843,960
Less accumulated depr & amort 175,358
668,602
Cash & cash equivalents 10,709
Accounts & notes receivable 9,927
Accounts receivable from related parties 5,582
Deferred charges and other assets 44,991
Total Assets 739,811
Liabilities & Shareholders Equity:
Unsecured notes payable 499,372
Mortgage notes payable 183,989
Other notes payable 188,797
Other note payable to affiliate
Accounts payable and other liabilities 77,102
Distributions in excess of new income of -
unconsolidated JV's 173,499
Total liabilities 1,122,759
Commitments and contingencies:
Accumulated deficiency in Assets (382,948)
739,811
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Taubman Centers, Inc.
Statement of Operations
1994
Revenues:
Minimum rent 111,373
Percentage rent 3,788
Recoveries from tenants 68,075
Other 8,981
Related party revenue from mgmt, lsg, devlpmt 4,917
Total revenue 197,134
Operating Costs:
Recoverable from tenants 58,355
Other operating 20,974
Mgmt, lsg, and development services 3,538
General & Administrative 17,942
Interest 47,732
Depreciation & amortization 27,653
Total operating costs 176,194
Income before equity in unconsolidated JVs
and before extraordinary items 20,940
Equity in income before extraordinary items
of unconsolidated JVs 51,263
Income before extraordinary items 72,203
Extraordinary items (44,731)
Net Income 27,472
Allocation of Net Income
General Partners 22,489
Limited Partners 4,983
27,472
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APPENDIX C
REIT Requirements
(i) 75% of the value of the REITs total assets must be in real estate assets, cash, and
government securities.
(ii) 75% of gross income for each taxable year must be derived from rents, interest on
obligations secured by mortgages, gains from the sale of certain assets or income
attributable to investments in other REITs.
(iii) 95% of gross income must be derived from rents, dividends, interest, and gain
from the sale or disposition of certain assets.
(iv) Short-term gains from the sale/disposition of stock or securities held for less than
six months and gain on sale or disposition of real property, excepting property
involuntarily converted or foreclosed on, held for less than four years must
represent less than 30% of gross income.
(v) Distributions to shareholders must equal or exceed 95% of REIT taxable
income. 174
174 Brueggeman and Fisher, op. cit., p. 697.
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